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THE STAGES OF LEGAL REASONING:
FORMALISM, ANALOGY, AND REALISM
WILSON HUHN*

N the late 19th Century, legal reasoning was dominated by formalistic
analysis.' Judges and lawyers reasoned deductively from base principles.2 Legal historians have persuasively described how leading judges
and scholars fomented a revolution in legal thought in the 20th Century.'
Starting about 1910, legal realism-or policy analysis-entered legal reasoning 4 to the point that today it would be unusual to find ajudicial opinion or brief that fails to explore the policy implications of an
interpretation of the law. This historical shift from formalism to realism
suggests that there are stages of legal reasoning.
In this Article, I argue that formalism, analogy and realism should be
considered to be the stages of legal reasoning. First, psychological research suggests that these methods of reasoning correspond to stages of
cognitive and moral development. Second, examination of judicial opinions in hard cases reveals that courts progress from formalism, to analogy,
to realism, in resolving difficult questions of law. Third, these three forms
of reasoning are necessary components in the evolution of rules and
standards.
* B.A. Yale University, 1972; J.D. Cornell Law School, 1977; McDowell
Professor of Law and Research Fellow, Constitutional Law Center, University of
Akron School of Law. Research for this Article was funded by a summer fellowship
awarded by the University of Akron School of Law. I wish to thank my research

assistants, Matthew Hudson and Patrick Walsh, for their valuable assistance. I am
also grateful to Associate Dean Elizabeth Reilly and Dr. Jay Levine of the University
of Akron School of Law, Professor Todd Brower of Western State University
College of Law, and Professor Howard Denemark of the Texas Wesleyan School of
Law for their generous and useful suggestions.
1. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 18701960 16-17, 199 (1992) (describing emergence of formalism in English common
law system); see also GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 41-67 (1977)
(describing evolution of American law in period between Civil War and World War
I). Horwitz characterizes American legal reasoning of the late 19th and early 20th
centuries as "categorical" in nature, in light of the tendency of courts to interpret
the law by invoking and defining general propositions of law. See HoRwITz, supra,
at 17 (illuminating nature of Nineteenth century legal thought). Gilmore refers to
the same period as "the age of faith," (i.e., faith in legal principles) in contrast to
"the age of anxiety" which followed it. GILMORE, supra, at 41 (examining perception of American law during period from Civil War to World War I).
2. See HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 199 (describing Legal Realists' critique of
orthodox legal reasoning).
3. See id. at 199-200 (differentiating legal realism from conceptualism).
4. See id. at 18 (describing growing importance of policy in legal decisionmaking in early Twentieth century).

(305)
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In characterizing these modes of analysis as "stages," I do not mean to
imply that analogy is superior to formalism or that realism is superior to
them both. 5 In fact, one might reasonably argue, asJustice Antonin Scalia
would, that the hierarchy proceeds in the opposite direction, in that one is
forced to resort to analogy only where formalism has failed, and that realism is the last resort of all. 6
It would be even more accurate to reject hierarchy altogether, and
the concomitant conceit that one form of legal analysis is superior to another. Rather than levels in a hierarchy, formalism, analogy and realism
are all stages of a cycle, each of which is necessary for the law to progress.
The ultimate purpose of legal analysis is to create a system of laws that is
clear, consistent and just, a code of conduct that is universally understood
and accepted. But this is a task that is beyond human ability. As H.L.A.
Hart observed, a perfect system of laws cannot be created "because we are
men, not gods." 7 However, formalism, analogy and realism each play a
critical role in the attempt to create a code of conduct that is logical, predictable and fair.
Accordingly, Part I of this Article defines formalism, analogy and realism by describing the psychological theories of James Mark Baldwin, Jean
Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg insofar as they shed light upon the cogni5. I describe the stages of legal reasoning as "soft stages" that appear or are
invoked sequentially, that are structurally distinct and that "prepare the way" for
subsequent stages. They are not the invariant and hierarchical "hard stages" of
Piaget and Kohlberg. For a discussion of the stages of Piaget and Kohlberg, see
infra notes 77-122 and accompanying text.
6. Justice Scalia criticizes realistic analysis as inappropriate judicial "fact-finding," but acknowledges that it cannot be "entirely avoided:"
I have not said that legal determinations that do not reflect a general rule
can be entirely avoided. We will have totality of the circumstances tests
and balancing modes of analysis with us forever-and for my sins, I will
probably write some of the opinions that use them. All I urge is that
those modes of analysis be avoided where possible; that the Rule of Law,
the law of rules be extended as far as the nature of the question allows;
and that, to foster a correct attitude toward the matter, we appellate
judges bear in mind that when we have finally reached the point where
we can do no more than consult the totality of the circumstances, we are
acting more as fact-finders than as expositors of the law.
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as the Law of Rules, 56 U. C-ni. L. REv. 1175, 1186-87
(1989).
7. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 128 (1994) (describing need for flexibility in legal rules due to inability of humans to prepare for all eventualities in
universe that is not finite). Hart traces the ambiguity of legal rules to two human
shortcomings: "our relative ignorance of fact" and "our relative indeterminacy of
aim." Id. Larry Alexander concurs with Hart by saying "[a]uthoritative rules that
are promulgated by human beings of finite reasoning and informational capacities
and that are meant to improve the moral condition of human beings of finite
reasoning and informational capacities will always fail to capture precisely the requirements of morality." Larry Alexander, Can Law Survive the Asymmetry of Authority, in RULES AND REASONING: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF FRED SCHAUER 39, 41 (Linda
Meyer ed., 1999) (asserting all human-made authoritative rules will be over- or
under-inclusive).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol48/iss1/5

2

Huhn: The Stages of Legal Reasoning: Formalism, Analogy, and Realism
2003]

STAGES OF LEGAL REASONING

tive and moral aspects of legal reasoning in general and formalism, analogy and realism in particular. 8 Formalism represents the "rule-bound"
thinking characteristic of the Piagetian stage of concrete operations and
the Kohlbergian stage of conventional thought. Realism, whose concern is
what the law might be, represents the Piagetian stage of formal operations
and the Kohlbergian stage of postconventional thought. Reasoning by
analogy straddles both stages; formalist analogies are concrete and conventional, while realist analogies are abstract and postconventional.
Part II illustrates how formalism, analogy and realism are sequentially
invoked to resolve hard cases. 9 When society changes, or other unexpected events occur that give rise to unforeseen legal problems, formalist
rules fail us and we rely upon analogies. When these analogies prove insufficient as well, we turn to realism, balancing all of the underlying values
and interests to develop new rules of law. In hard cases, reasoning by analogy serves as a bridge between formalism and realism.
Part III argues that the evolution of rules into standards, and standards into rules, also demonstrates the stages of legal reasoning.' 0 Evolution of the law in both directions is achieved by drawing analogies. Realist
analogies help turn rules into standards and formalist analogies help turn
standards into rules. The law evolves from rules to standards and back
again in an unending cycle of assimilation and accommodation.
I conclude that none of the three modes of analysis standing alone is
adequate to produce a clear, consistent and just system of laws. Legal progress depends upon using all three modes of analysis.
I.

DEVELOPMENTAL THEORY AND THE THREE STAGES OF

LEGAL REASONING

Law comprises both logic and morals. Legal decisions are deduced
from rules of law, however, to induce obedience, these decisions must not
only be logical but must also reflect the prevailing mores of society.''
Thus, legal reasoning inevitably attempts to meld the oft-conflicting strictures of logical rigor and moraljustice. What we know of the development
of logical and moral reasoning helps to explain how logic and morality are
combined in legal reasoning.
8. For a discussion the theories of Baldwin, Piaget and Kohlberg, see infra
notes 68-122 and accompanying text.
9. For a discussion of the use of formalism, analogy and realism to resolve
hard cases, see infra notes 178-353 and accompanying text.
10. For a further discussion of the evolution of rules into standards and standards into rules, see infra notes 354-90 and accompanying text.
11. See Edward S. Adams & Daniel A. Farber, Beyond the Formalism Debate: Expert
Reasoning, Fuzzy Logic, and Complex Statutes, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1243 (1999) (asserting

need for both textual analysis and evaluation of legislative history and social norms
in statutory interpretation); Wilson Huhn, The Use and Limits of Syllogistic Reasoning
in Bfiefing Cases, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 813 (illustrating importance and limita-

tions of using syllogistic reasoning to analyze judicial opinions).
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As people mature they adapt their intellectual and ethical systems to
meet new challenges. "When I was a child, I spoke as a child, I understood as a
child, I thought as a child: but when I became a man, I put away childish

things."12 Leading psychologists have charted sequential stages in the individual's patterns of cognitive and moral reasoning. In this Article, I suggest that legal reasoning, like cognitive and moral reasoning, progresses
through certain well-defined stages. Complex forms of legal reasoning
evolve from and build upon simpler forms, reflecting our attempts to meet
new challenges or to progress beyond current understandings of the law. I
propose that the stages of legal reasoning are formalism, analogy and
realism.
A.

The Definitions of Formalism, Analogy and Realism

Vincent Wellman, Richard Warner and Richard Posner have all identified three discrete forms of legal analysis.1 3 Wellman calls these forms of
15
14
legal reasoning "deduction," "analogy" and "practical reasoning."16
Warner refers to them as "the analogical model,"1 7 "the deductive
model" 18 and "the ideal reasoner model."' 19 Posner uses the terms "syllo22
21
gistic reasoning," 20 "reasoning by analogy" and "practical reasoning."
In this Article, I call these three forms of legal reasoning formalism, analogy
and realism.

12. 1 Corinthians 13:11 (describing imperfection of human knowledge).
13. Seegenerally RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OFJURISPRUDENCE (1990) (examining alternative theories of reasoning); Vincent Wellman, Practical Reasoning
and JudicialJustification: Toward an Adequate Theory, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 45 (1985)
(giving alternative interpretations of decision-making); Richard Warner, Note, The
Three Theories of Legal Reasoning, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 1523, 1551-70 (1989) (examining legal analysis in terms of analogical reasoning, deductive reasoning and ideal
reasoner theory).
14. Wellman, supra note 13, at 64 (explaining that deductive reasoning "provides the appropriate model for legal reasoning in general and judicial justification in particular").
15. Id. at 80 (describing analogical reasoning as "reasoning by example").
16. Id. at 87 (asserting need for reasoning from ends to means in judicial
justification).
17. Warner, supra note 13, at 1552 (describing analogical model of legal reasoning as "making analogical inferences").
18. Id. at 1555-56 (describing strength of deductive model as preservation of
justification in legal reasoning).
19. Id. at 1565 (asserting justification for deciding cases exist if all relevant
factors are considered dispassionately).
20. POSNER, supra note 13, at 38-39 (describing strength of syllogism in legal
reasoning).
21. Id. at 86-87 (describing reasoning by analogy as inductive reasoning).
22. Id. at 71 (describing practical reasoning as "action-oriented").
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Formalism

Formalism is the application of an existing rule of law by its terms to a
set of facts. 23 Formalists attempt to resolve disputes by defining the terms
of legal rules so as to include or exclude the facts of the case at hand.
Formalist arguments are deductive in nature, and conform to the structure of a syllogism of deductive logic: the rule of law is the major premise,
the facts of the case are the minor premise, and the legal result is the
24
conclusion.
Most formalists favor textual forms of analysis, and rely particularly
upon the "plain meaning" of the words of the legal text.2 5 This method of
analysis aspires to discover an objective definition of the text. But formalism is not limited to textualism. Specific rules may be derived from exami-

23. See Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 510 (1988) (defining
formalism). As Frederick Schauer explained:
With accelerating frequency, legal decisions and theories are condemned as "formalist" or "formalistic." But what is formalism, and what is
so bad about it?
At the heart of the word "formalism," in many of its numerous uses,
lies the concept of decisionmaking according to rule.... [I]nsofar as
formalism is frequently condemned as excessive reliance on the language
of a rule, it is the very idea of decisionmaking by rule that is being
condemned ....

Id. at 509-10.
24. See POSNER, supra note 13, at 38-39 (describing syllogistic method of logic);
Wellman, supra note 13, at 64-79 (describing deductive form of legal analysis);
Warner, supra note 13, at 1555-65 (defining deductive model). Hence, Wellman's
and Warner's description of this type of reasoning as "deductive," and Posner's use
of the term "syllogistic."; see also Huhn, supra note 11, at 814-18 (illustrating role
that syllogistic reasoning plays in legal analysis).
25. Judge Patricia Wald, who is not a formalist, offers the following description of the plain meaning rule: "The Plain Meaning Rule basically articulates a
hierarchy of sources from which to divine legislative intent. Text comes first, and if
it is clearly dispositive, then the inquiry is at an end." Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling
Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in ConstruingStatutes in the 1988-1989 Term of the
United States Supreme Court, 39 Am.U. L. REV. 277, 285 (1990). In addition to "plain
meaning," the two other textual methods of legal analysis utilize "intratextual arguments" and "canons of construction." Wilson Huhn, Teaching Legal Analysis Using
A PluralisticModel of Law, 36 GONZ. L. REV. 433, 442 (2000-2001) (describing textual analysis form of legal argument).
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nation of legislative intent,26 from specific traditions2 7 and even from
28
policy arguments.
The leading judicial advocate of formalism in American jurisprudence is United States Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia. 29 In The
Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, Scalia argues that the doctrine of popular
sovereignty dictates a formalist approach to legal reasoning, 30 and he of26. See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 515-24 (1989)
(discussing legislative history of FED. R. EVID. 609). In Green, for example, even
though the Supreme Court rejected a "plain meaning" approach to interpreting
Federal Rule of Evidence 609, the Court nevertheless arrived at a specific understanding of the meaning of the rule based upon an exhaustive examination of its

legislative history. See id. at 509, 515-24 (exploring Advisory Committee's analysis).
27. SeeTaylor v. Roeder, 360 S.E.2d 191, 195-96 (Va. 1987) (Compton, J., dissenting) (faulting majority's interpretation of Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)
as inflexible, where Code's basic purpose is flexibility and adaptability to commercial usage). Business traditions (e.g., trade usage) frequently define what is permissible under the Uniform Commercial Code. For example, in considering whether
a note with variable interest qualifies as a negotiable instrument, one judge argued
that "[i]nstruments providing that loan interest may be adjusted over the life of
the loan routinely pass with increasing frequency in this state and many others as
negotiable instruments. This Court should recognize this custom and usage, as the
commercial market has, and hold these instruments to be negotiable." Id. at 196

(Compton, J., dissenting).
28. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 113-14 (1973) (balancing interest of
State in health of mother against mother's rights). In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme
Court utilized policy analysis to develop a relatively specific timetable limiting the
scope of governmental regulation that is constitutionally permissible during each
trimester of a woman's pregnancy. See id. at 163-64 (declaring point at which
state's interest of health of mother emerges, after end of first trimester, when states
may regulate abortion if regulation "reasonably relates to the preservation and protection of maternal health").
29. See William N. Eskridge,Jr., Norms, Empiricism, and Canons in Statutory Interpretation, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 671, 671 (1999) (describing Justice Scalia as leader of
school ofjurisprudence which favors "an uncompromising application of statutory
plain meaning," deemed "the 'new textualism"'). Justice Scalia has suggested that
in interpreting a federal statute the intent of Congress "is best sought by examining the language that Congress used." Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 130
(1990) (Scalia,J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for using broad interpretation of
"falsely made" to include "forged").
30. See Scalia, supra note 6, at 1176 (introducing relationship between "general rule of law" and "personal discretion to do justice"). To make this point Scalia
invokes the image of good King Louis IX, listening to litigants and rendering justice under an oak tree. See id. at 1175-76. He then contrasts Louis's general dispensation of justice with the clarion call of Tom Paine: "For as in absolute
governments the king is law, so in free countries the law ought to be king ..
" Id.
at 1176. Justice Scalia also quotes Aristotle in support of the proposition that laws
should be as specific as possible:
Rightly constituted laws should be the final sovereign; and personal rule,
whether it be exercised by a single person or a body of persons, should be
sovereign only in those matters on which law is unable, owing to the difficulty of framing general rules for all contingencies, to make an exact
pronouncement.
Id. (quoting ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE, book III, ch. xi, § 19 at 127
(Ernest Barker trans., Oxford 1946)). James Wilson, on the other hand, has observed that Aristotle also advocated equitable justice stating "[e] quity must be ap-
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fers four reasons why rules should be preferred to standards. 3 1 He states
that when a legal standard leaves "a good deal of judgment to be
32
applied,"
equality of treatment is difficult to demonstrate and, in a multitiered judicial system, impossible to achieve; predictability is destroyed; judicial arbitrariness is facilitated; [and] judicial courage
33
is impaired.
This devotion to formalism is the hallmark ofJustice Scalia'sjurisprudence. Scalia interprets the plain meaning of text, 34 sometimes with the
aid of a dictionary, 35 and he rejects legislative history as a tool of interpretation. 36 Similarly, in construing our constitutional tradition, Scalia embraces the narrowest possible reading of our traditions, rejecting broad
statements of principle.3 7 He captured the essence of his jurisprudential
position in this aphorism: "A rule of law that binds neither by text nor by
38
any particular, identifiable tradition is no rule of law at all."

plied to forgivable actions ....

Equity bids us to be merciful to the weakness of

human nature." James G. Wilson, Surveying the Forms of Doctrine on the Bright LineBalancing Test Continuum, 27 ARiz. ST. L.J. 773, 825 (1995) (quoting ARISTOTLE, I
RHETORIC,

in THE

COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE

2153, 2188-89 (Jonathan Barnes

ed., J.O. Urmson trans., 1984)); see also generally Maureen B. Cavanaugh, Order in
Multiplicity: Aristotle on Text, Context, and the Rule of Law, 79 N.C. L. REv. 577 (2001)
(asserting that Aristotle should be understood as requiring contextually nuanced
approach to statutory interpretation).
31. See Scalia, supra note 6, at 1182 (noting disadvantages of not using rules).
32. Id. (asserting that judge in appellate position evaluation case via "totality
of the circumstances" becomes finder of fact).
33. Id. (highlighting "unfortunate practical consequences" of applying standards instead of rules).
34. Justice Scalia describes himself as "[o] ne who finds more often ... that the
meaning of a statute is apparent from its text .. " Antonin Scalia, JudicialDeference
to Administrative Interpretation of Law, 1989 DUKE L. J. 511, 521.
35. See, e.g., M.C.I. Telecomm. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 225
(1994) (relying on dictionaries, Justice Scalia interpreted "modify" in Communications Act of 1934).
36. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAw 29 (1997) (describing role of legislative history in statutory interpretation
as inferior to analyzing language of statute itself). Justice Scalia maintains that

legislative history "is much more likely to produce a false or contrived legislative
intent than a genuine one." Id. at 32. He has observed that "to tell the truth, the
quest for the 'genuine' legislative intent is probably a wild-goose chase anyway."
Scalia, supra note 34, at 517.
37. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (attackingJustice Brennan's dissent on grounds that it appealed to societal tradition while failing to identify that tradition).
38. Id. at 128 (emphasizing need to use most "specific tradition as the point of
reference" if "arbitrary decisionmaking is to be avoided").
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Reasoning by Analogy

One step removed from formalism is reasoning by analogy. Formalism, in law, is to apply a rule of law to a case because the facts of the case
are the same as the terms of the rule. Reasoning by analogy, in contrast, is
the application of a rule of law to a case because the facts of the case are
similar to the terms of the rule. While formalism is scientific and
grounded in logic,5 9 analogical reasoning is an art that is grounded in
40
rhetoric.
Reasoning by analogy is most closely associated with the invocation of
precedent, but it is by no means limited to that modality. Courts frequently invoke statutory analogies, and scholars have studied their power41
ful impact.
The leading American authority on analogical reasoning was Edward
Levi, who served as Attorney General of the United States and Dean of the
Chicago Law School. In the following much-cited passage from An Introduction to Legal Reasoning,42 Levi described the process of analogical

reasoning:
The basic pattern of legal reasoning is reasoning by example. It
is reasoning from case to case. It is a three-step process described
by the doctrine of precedent in which a proposition descriptive
of the first case is made into a rule of law and then applied to a
next similar situation. The steps are these: similarity is seen between cases; next the rule of law inherent in the first case is announced; then the rule of law is made applicable to the second
case.

43

39. See Huhn, supra note 11, at 823 (noting similarities and differences between law and science).
40. See Emily Sherwin, A Defense of Analogical Reasoning in Law, 66 U. C-. L.
REV. 1179, 1179 (1999) ("[A]nalogical reasoning is an unscientific practice with
imperfect results .... ").
41. See generally Hans W. Baade, The Cassus Omissus: A Pre-Histoy of Statutory
Analogy, 20 SYRACUSEJ. INT'L L. & COM. 45, 46 (1994) (giving historical account of
how civil law and common law parted ways on use of analogy in applying statutes);
Robert E. Keeton, Statutory Analogy, Purpose and Policy in Legal Reasoning: Live Lobsters and a Tiger Cub in the Park, 52 MD. L. REV. 1192, 1192 (1993) (asserting analogy
as principal method by which judges decide cases).
42. See EDWARD LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 1-2 (1948) (exploring process of legal reasoning). Larry Alexander refers to this as a "classic"
work on legal reasoning. Larry Alexander, The Banality of Legal Reasoning, 73 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 517, 523 (1998) (stating importance of analogical reasoning in

addition to deduction based on precedents).
43. LEVI, supra note 42, at 1-2 (describing need for analogical reasoning due
to impossibility of drafting laws which cover all situations with clarity).
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Over the past decade analogical reasoning has received much atten45
44
tion from legal scholars. In particular, Cass Sunstein, Scott Brewer,
47
46
have made important contributions
and Todd Brower
Emily Sherwin
by
analogy. Describing the advantages
of
reasoning
understanding
to our
of reasoning by analogy, Sunstein observed that "analogical reasoning introduces a degree of stability and predictability." 48 Emily Sherwin identifies a number of other benefits of reasoning by analogy in the following
passage:
In my view, the virtue of analogical reasoning lies in a variety of
indirect benefits that are likely to result when judges adopt it as a
practice and consider themselves obliged to explain new decisions in terms of their relation to past cases. First, a diligent process of studying and comparing prior decisions produces a wealth
of data for decisionmaking. Second, the rules and principles that
result from analogical reasoning represent the collaborative efforts of a number of judges over time. Third, analogical reasoning tends to correct biases that might otherwise lead judges to
discount the likelihood or importance of reliance on prior decisions. Fourth, analogical reasoning exerts a conservative force
on law: by holding the development of law to a gradual pace, it
44. See Cass Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 743-49
(1993) (explaining operation of analogical reasoning within law).
45. See Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics,and the Rational
Force of Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 HARv.L. REV. 925, 926 (1996) ("developing a
philosophical explanation of analogical reasoning .... ). Brewer describes two
schools of thought regarding reasoning by analogy, which he calls "mystics" and
"skeptics":
Theories of analogy differ from each other in the degree of rational force
they attribute to analogical argument. In one group are the "mystics,"
who place a high degree of confidence in analogical argument even
though they neither have nor feel the need for an explanation of its characteristic concepts of "relevance" and "similarity." In the other group are
the "skeptics," who have rather less confidence in the rational force of
analogical argument.
Id. at 951.
46. See Sherwin, supra note 40, at 1179-83 (defending practice of analogical
reasoning by judges).
47. See Todd Brower, "A Stranger to Its Laws:" Homosexuality, Schemas, and the
Lessons and Limits of Reasoning by Analogy, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 65, 66 (1997)
(contending that reasoning by analogy has failed gays and lesbians). For a further
exploration regarding the plight of gays and lesbians, see infra note 173 and accompanying text.
48. Sunstein, supra note 44, at 783 (stating importance of precedent on consistency to avoid injustice). Sunstein acknowledges that reasoning by analogy has
inherent limitations as well stating that the "[u]se of analogies produces principled
consistency, at best, and not truth at all." Id. at 777. Another scholar agrees, commenting that "[d] rawing analogies indiscriminately leads to questionable results."
Bryan Beier, The Perils of Analogical Reasoning:Joseph William Singer, Property and Sovereignty and Property, I GEO. MASON L. REv. 33, 57 (1994) (noting that although
reasoning by analogy is useful way of analyzing problems, it "has its limits and
perils").
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limits the scope of error and contributes to public acceptance of
49
law as a standard of conduct.
But there is a powerful dissenting voice, that of Larry Alexander. In
The Banality of Legal Reasoning, Alexander states generally that there is

nothing special about legal reasoning to distinguish it from reasoning
used in other settings or vocations. 5° In particular, Alexander reasons that
lawyers do not reason by analogy: "There is no additional kind of reasoning-for example, 'analogical reasoning'-that lawyers employ."' I
Alexander's principal contention is that reasoning by analogy boils
down to either formalism or realism, and that analogical reasoning, therefore, should not be treated as a separate category. 52 I disagree. While
there is wide agreement that analogical reasoning can be either formalistic
or realistic, 53 this does not necessarily mean that there is nothing special

about reasoning by analogy. In contrast, I contend that this is precisely
what is special about analogical reasoning. Analogy is the link between
formalism and realism.
To reason by analogy is to find similarities between the situation at
hand and other known situations. In law, the most common form of ana49. Sherwin, supra note 40, at 1186 (asserting that analogy to past cases
strengthens predictability of law).
50. See Alexander, supra note 42, at 517 (stating that legal reasoning involves
moral reasoning, empirical reasoning and deductive reasoning as well as normal
reasoning). Alexander states:
My intention is ... to clear away the mysticism and mumbo jumbo that is
usually associated with "thinking like a lawyer" and to claim that thinking
like a lawyer is just ordinary forms of thinking clearly and well. More
precisely, thinking like a lawyer boils down to moral reasoning, empirical
reasoning, and deductive reasoning, and lawyers reason in these ways exactly as everyone else does. There is no additional form of reasoning,
special to them, in which lawyers engage. Law schools are well-equipped
to teach students how to think like lawyers; but because moral, empirical,
and deductive reasoning are taught or refined in other venues, law
schools have no monopoly.
Id.
51. Id. at 518 (asserting analogical reasoning is merely deduction after identification of appropriate norms); see also Sunstein, supra note 44, at 741 n.2 (listing
number of other authorities critical of analogical reasoning).
52. See Larry Alexander, Incomplete Theorizing: A Review Essay of Cass R. Sunstein's Legal Reasoning and PoliticalConflict, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 531, 541 (1997)
(critiquing Sunstein's application of analogical reasoning to law). Alexander
observes:
There are big stakes riding on the success of some defense of ARIL [analogical reasoning in law] as something other than either deduction from
rules or RE [reflective equilibrium]. The autonomy of legal reasoningand with it, the autonomy of law as a discipline-rests on such a defense
of ARIL. Sunstein, I believe, has failed to provide such a defense. Given
his formidable talent, Sunstein's failure should give backers of law's autonomy cause for worry.
Id.
53. For further information regarding formalistic and realistic legal analysis,
see infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
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logical reasoning is the use of precedent. In common law jurisprudential
54
systems like ours, court decisions are recognized as a valid source of law.
When a previously decided case is discovered that is "on point," the rule of
the previous case governs the case to be decided. Not infrequently, the
previous case is not precisely on point with the case to be decided. In this
circumstance, the court must decide whether the previous case is sufficiently analogous for its rule to govern the case to be decided. It also
frequently happens that there is more than one case that arguably applies
to the case at hand. In that circumstance, courts that reason by analogy
must determine which of the previous cases is most similar to the case to
be decided.
Several scholars have noted that analogies may be either formalistic
or realistic. A formalist analogy is one based upon the similarities between
55
the facts of the cited case and the facts of the case under consideration.
A realist analogy is based upon the similarities between the values served
by the rule of law from the cited case and the values that are at stake in the
case at hand. 56 Part III of this Article explores the difference between
formalist and realist analogies, and demonstrates how reasoning by anal5
ogy serves as a bridge between formalism and realism.. 1
54. See generally Harold J. Berman & Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Transformation of
English Legal Science: From Hale to Blackstone, 45 EMORY L.J. 437, 446-49 (1996) (crediting Lord ChiefJustices Edward Coke and Matthew Hale with investing precedent
with force of law).
55. See generally Sunstein, supra note 44, at 756-57 (citing Holmes's "notorious"
opinion in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) as example of bad formalist analogy).
Sunstein cites the inherent weakness of purely factual analogies:
Formalist analogical thinking is no better than any other kind of bad formalism. Different factual situations are inarticulate; they do not impose
order on themselves. Patterns are made, not simply found. Whether one
case is analogous to another depends on substantive ideas that must be
justified.
Id.
56. See generally Alexander, supra note 42, at 530 (stating that it is "principle
immanent in [past] decisions [that] is the gauge of relevant 'likeness' and 'unlikeness' in analogical reasoning from the cases"); John Dickinson, The Lazo Behind
Law I1,
29 COLUM. L. REV. 285, 289-90 (1929) (noting that laws, unlike science, are
"the result of value judgments, rather than judgment of fact..."). As Dickinson
explained:
The choice which ajudge makes of one analogy rather than another is an
expression of... a value-judgment; and the possibility of competing analogies therefore arises not merely or so much out of the doubtfulness of
the factual resemblances among his materials, but rather out of the possibility of differences of opinion as to the comparative value of the different results which one analogy or the other would bring about.
Id. at 290. Richard Warner states, "The salient difference between Columbia and
Southern Concrete is that, in the latter, the two companies had never dealt with each
other before. Is this a relevant difference? Courts answer such questions by appeal
to the legitimate goals and purposes of the law." Warner, supra note 13, at 1539-40.
57. For a discussion of the difference between formalist and realist analogies,
see infra notes 259-73 and accompanying text.
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Realism

59
Legal realism, also called policy analysis, 58 or practical reasoning,
emerged from the British school of utilitarianism and the American philosophy of pragmatism. 60 It is an ends-means analysis that entails a judicial balancing of the costs and benefits of a legal outcome. Legal realism
is a method of legal reasoning that determines what the law is, not by
invoking categorical legal principles, but rather by considering the law's
probable consequences.6 1 Law should be interpreted not by consulting a
dictionary, but by inquiring into the underlying purposes of the law. 62 The
courts should not seek a literal definition of the terms of the law, but
should rather seek to fulfill the values that the law is intended to serve.
The guiding principle of legal realism was expressed by this nation's
most eloquent jurist, Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Cardozo, who
observed:

The final cause of law is the welfare of society. The rule that
misses its aim cannot permanently justify its existence ....

Logic

and history and custom have their place. We will shape the law
58. See Richard Posner, JurisprudentialResponses to Legal Realism, 73 CORNELL L.
REv'. 326, 326 (1988) (defining legal realism as "the use of policy analysis in legal
reasoning").
59. See generally POSNER, supra note 13, at 71 (defining practical reasoning as

use of deliberation and practical syllogism to make practical and ethical choice);

Wellman, supra note 13, at 46 (suggesting use of practical reasoning as alternative
to deductive reasoning).
60. See WILSON HUHN, THE FIVE TYPES OF LE.AL ARGUMENTS 53-63 (2002)
(describing history of relation between legal realism and teleological philosophy);
see also Roberta Kevelson, Semiotics and Methods of Legal Inquiry: Interpretation and
Discovery in Law from the Perspective of Peirce'sSpeculative Rhetoric, 61 IND. L.J. 355, 356
(1986) (analyzing relation between legal realism and philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce); see generally Louis MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB 201-34 (2001)

(describing history of relation between Peirce, Holmes and other leading contexttialists of late l9th and early 20th Century).
61. See Sunstein, supra note 44, at 787 (describing role of economic analysis in
law). In distinguishing analogical reasoning from realist analysis, Sunstein notes
"[o]ne cannot discover consequences by examining other judicial holdings." Id.
62. The principle that statutes should be interpreted in light of their legislative purpose is centuries old. In Heydon's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (1584), Lord
ChiefJustice Coke advised judges to take the following factors into account in the
interpretation of statutes:

Ist. What was the common law before the making of the act.
2nd. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did
not provide.
3rd. What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure
the disease of the commonwealth.
And, 4th. The true reason of the remedy; and then the office of all the
judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief,
and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions
for continuance of the mischief, and pro privato commodo, and to add
force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the
makers of the Act, pro bono publico.
Heydon's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. at 638.
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to conform to them when we may; but only within bounds. The
63
end which the law serves will dominate them all.
As noted above, when there are two existing rules of law that arguably
apply by analogy to the present case, legal realists choose between them by
determining which rule better achieves the underlying purposes of the law
in the case. 6 4 This is realistic analogical reasoning. But what if neither of
the existing rules precisely serves the values that are at stake in the case
under consideration? In these circumstances, it is necessary to construct a
new rule of law, taking into account all of the values and interests that will
be affected by the new rule. Legal realism is the identification, interpretation and creation of rules of law in light of the intended purposes, underlying values and likely consequences of the law.
Richard Posner observes that people differ as to what the purposes,
values and consequences of the law are, particularly in Constitutional Law,
where fundamental human rights are at stake:
When you think of all those constitutional theories jostling one
another-Epstein's that would repeal the New Deal, Ackerman's
and Sunstein's that would constitutionalize it, Michelman's that
would constitutionalize the platform of the Democratic Party,
Tushnet's that would make the Constitution a charter of socialism, Ely's that would resurrect Earl Warren, and some that would
mold constitutional law to the Thomists' version of natural lawyou see the range of choice that the approach legitimizes and, as
a result, the instability of constitutional doctrine that it
65
portends.
Thus, legal realism is an analytic tool that can be wielded in service of any
ideology.66
Policy analysis comprises a number of subsidiary skills. First, one must
imagine the hypothetical consequences of interpreting the law one way or
another. Second, one must identify the interest or abstract principle that
a rule serves. Third, one must evaluate the weight of that interest or principle. Fourth, one must estimate the likelihood that the rule will accomplish its goal and serve this interest or principle. Finally, one must
simultaneously balance the weight and likelihood of all of the competing
63. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, TIE NArURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 66 (1921).
64. See Posner, supra note 58, at 326 (noting importance of using public policy
to solve legal problems).
65. Richard Posner, Legal Reasoningfrom the Top Down and from the Bottom Up:
The Question of Unenumerated Constitutional Rights, 59 U. C-H. L. Ri.v. 433, 445
(1992) (asserting that due to numerous, strong, conflicting themes, there exists
role for conscience in legal reasoning).
66. This is consistent with the neo-Kohlbergian view that postconventional
thought "is not defined in terms of any single moral philosophy." JAMES REST ET
AL., POSTCONVENTIONAL MORAL THINKING 40 (1999) (describing present state of
moral philosophy as unsettled).
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interests and principles. 67 All of these tasks require the skills that are developed at later stages of cognitive and moral development.
B.

The Developmental Theories ofJames Mark Baldwin, Jean Piaget and
Lawrence Kohlberg

In support of the thesis that formalism, analogy and realism are stages
of legal analysis, I draw upon three influential theories of human development: James Mark Baldwin's theory of assimilation and accommodation,
Jean Piaget's stages of intellectual development and Lawrence Kohlberg's
model of moral development. These theories of human development,
along with their associated stages, mirror the stages used in legal analysis
and provide guidance into its understanding.
1. James Mark Baldwin

James Mark Baldwin was a student of the neo-Darwinian G. Stanley
Hall, a founder of modern psychology who embraced Haeckel's theory
that "ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny. '68 Like Hall, Baldwin compared
the progress of an individual to the advancement of the human race, and
described this progress as the successive adoption of "new modes of
accommodation":
Here are two great movements, one that of the individual growing constantly more competent to understand himself and to
communicate what he understands; and here is society, made up
of a series of generations of individuals, doing precisely the same
thing and doing it upon precisely the same mass of materials. It is
on the surface likely that the series of critical periods in both,
marked by new modes of accommodation and due to new crises
of a natural, moral, and political sort, would show a general serial
correspondence.

69

67. These skills correspond to the five questions I teach students to ask when
attacking policy arguments:
1. Is the factual prediction accurate?
2. Is the value at stake one of the purposes of the law?
3. Is the value at stake sufficiently strong?
4. How likely is it that the decision in this case will serve this value?
5. Are there other, competing values that are also at stake?
HUHN, supra note 60 at 133.
68. Barney Beins, A Brief Biological Sketch of G. Stanley Hall, 2002 C. Stanley
Hall/Harry Kirke Wolfe Lectures, at http://www.ithaca.edu/beins/gsh/gsh.htm
(last visited Aug. 5, 2002); see also ROBBIE CASE, INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT: BIRth
T"o ADULTHOOD 9 (1985) (giving brief background of Baldwin).
69. Christopher E. Green, Classics in the History of Psychology, at http:// psychclassics.yorku.ca/Baldwin/History/chapl-l.htm (last visited Aug. 5, 2002) (quoting JAMES MARK BALDWIN, HISTORY AND PSYCHOLOGY: A SKETCH AND AN
INTERPRETATION

(1913)). Here is how Baldwin explained his theory of "genetic

development":
To investigate the child by scientific methods is really to bring into psychology a procedure which has revolutionized the natural sciences; and it
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In 1894, Baldwin articulated the first theory of intellectual development. 70 The heart of Baldwin's theory was that people respond to their
environment in two fundamental ways-by means of "assimilation" and
"accommodation." 71 Assimilation is the individual's habitual use of a behavioral or mental structure (a "schema") in response to external stimuli. 72 Baldwin suggested that a person assimilates and responds to familiar
stimuli just as the body assimilates food. 73 For Baldwin, the process of
assimilation explained habit formation, but it was inadequate to explain
74
human development.
Baldwin proposed a second process by which the individual adapts to
75
Accomunfamiliar stimuli, a process that he called "accommodation."
modation is the adjustment of our behavioral and mental schemas in response to new stimuli. Baldwin's conception of the process of
accommodation has been described as follows:
First, the infant assimilates a new situation to an already existing
schema. Second, it discovers that this assimilation is not successful. At this point it experiences conflict, and activates whatever
other schemas or components of schemas seem of possible relevance. Finally, these schemas are coordinated into a higher order schema. The new schema is then applied, and the process of
76
habit formation begins again.
is destined to revolutionize the moral sciences by making them also in a
great measure natural sciences. The new and important question about
the mind which is thus recognized is this: How did it grow? What light
upon its activity and nature can we get from a positive knowledge of its
early stages and processes of growth? This at once introduces other questions: How is the growth of the child related to that of the animals?how, through heredity and social influences, to the growth of the race
and of the family and society in which he is brought up? All this can be
comprehended only in the light of the doctrine of evolution, which has
rejuvenated the sciences of life; and we are now beginning to see a rejuvenation of the sciences of mind from the same point of view. This is what
is meant when we hear it said that psychology is becoming "genetic".
JAMES MARK BALDWIN, THE STORY OF THE MIND 54 (1904) (discussing study of chil-

dren's minds).
70. See CASE, supra note 68, at 9 (introducing Baldwin's work). "Baldwin ...

discerned a prelogical phase (based on imagination and memory), a logical phase
(based on reasoning; concurrent with language acquisition), and a hyperlogical
phase (based on flexible processes of problem solving transcending syllogistic reasoning) in the development of the child's mind." 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PSYCHOLOGY
363 (Alan E. Kazdin ed., 2000).
71. CASE, supra note 68, at 10 (detailing Baldwin's theory of intellectual
development).
72. See id. (describing process of schema activation).
73. See id. (noting how well-established schema are activated automatically
and "a smooth, well coordinated response is observed").
74. See id. (postulating process that can "lead to higher levels of adaptation").
75. Id. (defining accommodation).
76. See id. (exploring process of accommodation).
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I propose that Baldwin's theory of "assimilation and accommodation"
helps explain the progression of legal reasoning from formalism, to analogy, to realism in hard cases.
2.

Jean Piaget

Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget is considered the dominant figure in
the field of developmental psychology. 77 He was trained in zoology and
epistemology and, by establishing a link between these fields, he created a
stage theory of cognitive development for which he is most famous. 78 He
7
also initiated the study of moral development in children. '
Piaget built upon Baldwin's theories. 81 1 In particular, Piaget employed Baldwin's notions of assimilation and accommodation. 8 ' Piaget's
understanding of these concepts is described as follows: "Assimilation involves the person's dealing with the environment in terms of his structures, while accommodation involves the transformation of his structures
82
in response to the environment."
Piaget utilized interviews with children to discover their cognitive patterns. Over a period of decades Piaget presented children with a variety of
questions, problems and tasks, and observed the strategies they used to
answer the questions, solve the problems or perform the tasks. Piaget concluded, like Baldwin, that children first attempt to assimilate new stimuli
to existing mental structures. If this is unsuccessful, children accommodate their mental structures to take account of the new information.
Piaget observed that people's intellectual strategies progress in well-defined steps, and he proposed the following system of cognitive stages:
1.

Sensorimotor Period (approximately birth to two years old) 83

77. See Robert L. Campbell, Jean Piaget's Genetic Epistemology: Appreciation and

Critique, at http://htibcap.clemson.edu/-campber/piaget.html (last visited Aug. 5,
2002) (discussing Piaget's contributions to psychological research). "Developmental psychology owes a great debt to a Swiss thinker named Jean Piaget. Without his
contributions, it is fair to say that the discipline would not exist." Id.
78. See CASE, supra note 68 at 10. (detailing history of Piaget's career); see also
6 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PSYCHOLOGY 193 (Alan E. Kadzin ed., 2000) (giving background on Piaget).
79. See John M. Darley & Thomas R. Shultz, Moral Rules: Their Content and
Acquisition, 41 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 525, 526 (1990) (giving brief history of study of

moral judgments). "The major impetus for the empirical study of moral judgments was provided by Piaget's (1932) The MoralJudgment of the Child ... " I.
80. See CASE, supra note 68, at 13 (detailing Piaget's theory of intellectual development). When James Mark Baldwin lived in Paris, he was "in contact with the
young Jean Piaget, whom he strongly influenced." 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PSYC: I0OVY
363-64 (Alan E. Kazdin ed., 2000) (exploring influences ofJames Mark Baldwin).
81.

See HERBERT GINSBURG & SYLVIA OPPER, PIAGEr'S THEORY OF INTELLECTUAL

DEVELiOPMENT 18 (1988) (outlining Piaget's theoretical framework).

82. Id. at 19 (discussing how assimilation and accommodation relate to each
other).
83. Development of Intelligence: Jean Piagets Work, Encyclopedia Britannica, at

http://www.britannica.com/eb/article?eu=109299tocid=13349 (last visited Aug. 5,
2002) (describing sensorimotor period). In the sensorimotor period, the child
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84
Preoperational Period (approximately two to seven years old)
Concrete Operational Period (approximately seven to twelve
85
years old)
Formal Operational Period (after approximately twelve years

old).

86

Piaget observed that as people mature, their reasoning evolves in a
number of fundamental yet related ways. First, he discovered that people
only gradually acquire the ability to consider more than one aspect of a

problem at a time.8 7 As they master concrete operations, children develop the ability to manipulate a number of physical or factual variables
88
simultaneously.
Second, Piaget found that younger children lack certain mental operations that would enable them to understand the world in a more comprehensive fashion. At earlier stages, children equate changes in appearance
"learns how to modify reflexes to make them more adaptive, to coordinate actions,
to retrieve hidden objects, and, eventually, to begin representing information
mentally." Id.
84. Id. During the preoperational period, the child "experiences the growth
of language and mental imagery and learns to focus on single perceptual dimensions, such as colour [sic] and size." Id.
85. Id. During the period of concrete operations the child "develops an important set of skills referred to as conservation skills." Id.
86. Id. In the period of formal operations, the adolescent "develops thinking
skills in all logical combinations and learns to think with abstract concepts." Id.
87. See GINSBURG & OPPER, supra note 81, at 108-09 (giving example of problem solving question posed to child). Ginsburg and Opper note:
Piaget's studies of reasoning find that the child has a tendency to group
together various different events into a loose and confused whole (syncretism), that he sometimes fails to see the relations among separate events
(juxtaposition); that he fails to understand ordinal relations; and that he
cannot deal with the relations between a part and the whole of which it is
a member. All of these types of reasoning reveal a common deficiency:
an inability to think simultaneously about several aspects of a situation.
Id. at 108. Describing a preoperational child (approximately four to seven years
old):
The child tends to focus on a limited amount of the information available. In the conservation of number, [the child] judges two sets equal
when they are the same length, and ignores another relevant variable, the
density. In the conservation of continuous quantity, the child judges two
amounts equal when the heights of the columns of liquid are the same
and ignores the width. In the construction of ordinal relations (the problem of ordering ten sticks in terms of height), he succeeds only by considering the tops of the sticks and ignoring the bottoms, or vice versa. In all
these problems, the preoperational child deploys his attention in overly
limited ways. He focuses on one dimension of a situation, fails to make
use of another, equally relevant dimension, and therefore cannot appreciate the relations between the two.
d. at 154 (noting that one general cognitive characteristic of this period is
concentration).
88. See id. (describing concrete operational child). In contrast to younger
children, a child who has mastered concrete operations "tends to focus on several
dimensions of a problem simultaneously and to relate these dimensions." Id.
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with essential changes,8 9 they fail to anticipate that certain operations may
be reversed 9° and they do not understand that certain relations are reciprocal. 9 1 Children slowly acquire these related concepts of conservation,
92
reversibility and reciprocity.
Third, Piaget confirmed that people only gradually develop the ability
to engage in abstract reasoning. Children understand the world in immediate and concrete terms, while adolescents acquire the ability to consider
abstract ideas. "Whereas earlier the adolescent could love his mother or
hate a peer, now he can love freedom or hate exploitation." 9 3 This marks
the transition from concrete operations to formal operations.
Fourth, Piaget found that at the level of formal operations children
learn to perform logical functions to manipulate ideas just as they had
earlier learned the skills of conservation, reversibility and reciprocity in
the manipulation of physical objects. 9 4 The acquisition of these skills
makes it possible for them to consider hypothetical situations. Just as
younger children learn to physically manipulate concrete objects, older
children learn to manipulate mental images to consider what is possible:
In the stage of formal thought, the adolescent develops the ability to imagine the possibilities inherent in a situation. Before acting on a problem which confronts him, the adolescent analyzes it
and attempts to develop hypotheses concerning what might occur. These hypotheses are numerous and complex because the
89. See id. at 154-55 (discussing differences between children at earlier and
later stages). For example, younger children believe that changing the shape of an
object makes "more" or "less" of it, because they have not yet acquired the concept
of "conservation." Id.
90. See id. at 156 (discussing how thoughts of preopertaional children are
static and unable to carry out actions mentally so as to understand they are reversible). Reversibility of an operation is illustrated by the discovery that a narrow, tall
container may contain the same amount of liquid as a short, wide one: "By carrying
out the action mentally, that is, by reversing the pouring in his mind, he is able to
ascertain that the quantity of water in C (the lower wider glass) is the same as in B."
Id.
91. See id. (explaining reciprocity and contrasting with reversibility). The
container example, in which one is tall and narrow while the other is short and
wide, provides an example of a reciprocal relationship. In comparing the liquid
quantities within each container, "when the child says that one glass is longer and
thinner, whereas the other is shorter and wider, he is canceling out the differences
between the two glasses by an action of reciprocity." Id.
92. See id. at 155 (summarizing preoperational child's thought). A child who
has mastered concrete operations "focuses on several aspects of a situation simultaneously, is sensitive to transformations, and can reverse the direction of thought."
Id.
93. Id. at 203 (discussing thought process of adolescents).
94. See id. at 201-04 (commenting on actual use of formal operations). Piaget
identified four logical functions that the adolescent learns to perform at the stage
of formal operations: identity, negation, reciprocity and correlativity. See id. at 19495.
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adolescent takes into account all possible combinations of even95
tualities in an exhaustive way.
Fifth, Piaget discovered that children grow in their ability to understand and apply rules. He investigated this by observing how children
played the game of marbles. 9 6 He found that young children had idiosyncratic understandings of the rules of the game of marbles, frequently differing from those of their playmates. 9 7 He also discovered, paradoxically,
that young children believe that the rules of a game are absolute and inviolate. 98 In contrast, by the age of 10 to 12, children not only understand
and obey the standard rules of the game, they also understand that the
rules can be changed and they take pleasure in elaborating upon the rules
to cover various contingencies. The following story illustrates in colorful
fashion the "legalistic tendencies" of children at the stage of concrete
operations:
Piaget tells a delightful anecdote about the legalistic tendencies
of this stage. He observed a group of boys aged 10 and 11 who
were preparing to have a snowball fight. Before getting on with
it, they devoted a considerable amount of time to dividing themselves into teams, electing officers, devising an elaborate set of
rules to regulate the throwing of snowballs, and deciding on a
system of punishments for transgressors. Before they had actually settled on all these legalistic aspects of the game, it was time
to return home, and no snowball game had been played. Yet, all
the players seemed content with their afternoon. 99
95. Id. at 206 (discussing stage of formal thought).
96. See id. at 96 (considering moral behavior and judgment through consideration of game of marbles).
97. See id. at 97 (discussing children's understanding of rules).
98. See id. at 99 (making observations from game of marbles).
99. Id. at 98. Carol Gilligan has observed that girls, in general, care less about
the rules themselves than boys do. One pair of legal scholars drew these conclusions from Gilligan's findings:
"[B]oys' games appeared to last longer not only because they required a higher degree of skill and were thus less likely to become boring,
but also because, when disputes arose in the course of a game, boys were
able to resolve the disputes more effectively than girls ....
In fact, it
seemed that the boys enjoyed the legal debates as much as they did the
game itself." Perhaps then, the traditionally male-dominated legal profession, which is by nature a dispute-resolving discipline, became male-dominated out of primitive man's ability to effectively resolve the earliest
playground disputes over the last drumstick from Tyrannosaurus Rex.
But while males seem to demonstrate a talent for confrontation and
debate, girls, as Gilligan observed, tend to be more pragmatic toward the
rules of the game. For while males tend throughout childhood to become "increasingly fascinated with legal elaboration of rules and the development of fair procedures for adjudicating conflicts, [that fascination]
does not hold for girls." Girls regarded rules as good as long as the rule
compensated completely for any harm that may have been done by the
rule's violation. Generally, the girls observed were more tolerant about

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2003

19

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 1 [2003], Art. 5
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48: p. 305

Thus, by the end of the period of concrete operations, children have acquired the ability to create and interpret rules in concrete settings.10 0
Sixth, followers of Piaget have also closely studied the development of
the individual's cognitive ability to draw analogies, and discovered that a
fundamental change occurs as the child moves from concrete to formal
operations. Researchers found that by age 9 or 10, in the later stages of
concrete operations and at about the same age that they master rules, children are capable of identifying analogies using concrete nouns, verbs and
adjectives.' 0 1 For example, children at this level can complete the following analogies:
1.

(steel, stone, solid, soft or

Black is to white as hard is to

blue).
is to see as knife is to cut (fork, eye, look, shape or

2.

blue).
3.

Ink is to pen as paint is to
102
paper).

_

(color, spray, brush or

But by age 11 or 12 there appears a qualitative shift in children's ability to draw analogies, in that children acquire the ability to identify ab03
stract relations between concrete terms, as in the following problem:1
violations of the rules, more willing to make exceptions, more easily reconciled to changes in the game, and more likely to resolve conflicts creatively. Gilligan's thesis is that care and relationships are largely
overlooked by the judicial system's current methods of analyzing moral
dilemmas. But "while they are used by both men and women, women
focus on care and relationships considerably more than men do."
Sherrine M. Walker & Christopher D. Wall, FeministJurisprudence:Justice and Care,
11 BYUJ. PUB. L. 255, 261 (1997) (quoting CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE
9 (1982)); CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 9 (1982). For a discussion of
Gilligan's influence on cognitive theory and jurisprudence, see infra notes 151-68
and accompanying text.
100. See GINSBURG & OPPER, supra note 81, at 101-02 (discussing children at
end of period of concrete operations). Ginsburg and Opper state:
[A]s he grows older the child evolves from a position of submission to
adults to one of equality. He is also confronted with beliefs contradictory
to those he has been taught. Both of these experiences influence the
child to see rules as having a human, and hence fallible, origin, and to
agree to participate in their formation and alteration. Since the child
now has a hand in the formation of rules, they no longer exist as a foreign entity imposed on his conscience; they no longer exist as a code
which may be unquestionably respected, occasionally obeyed, and seldom
understood. The child now chooses to follow rules which are his own or
at least freely agreed upon.
Id.

101. See CASE, supra note 68, at 217 (detailing studies of reasoning on verbal
analogies).
102. See id. (presenting analogies that children can complete by end of period
of concrete operations).
103. See id. at 218 (describing further analogical capabilities of children).
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4.

Food is to body as water is to
(storm, coat or
ground)104
Between the ages of 13 and 15, children acquire the additional ability
to solve analogies that involve abstract relationships between abstract
entities:
5. Task is to
as problem is to solution (attempt, comple10 5
tion, work, end or question).
In summary, Piaget and other developmental psychologists have discovered that as individuals master concrete operations, they acquire the
concepts of conservation, reversibility and reciprocity in concrete terms;
they develop the ability to follow and formulate rules; they acquire the
ability to draw concrete analogies; and they learn to manipulate a number
of physical or factual variables simultaneously.I° 6 As individuals make the
transition to formal operations, they become capable of performing logical functions with abstract concepts; they learn to draw analogies involving
abstract concepts and relations; they become capable of contemplating hypothetical situations; and they learn to manipulate a number of abstract
concepts simultaneously. The transition from concrete operations to formal operations in cognitive reasoning corresponds to the transition from
formalism to realism in legal reasoning.
3.

Lawrence Kohlberg

Lawrence Kohlberg, a leading figure in the field of the psychology of
moral development, 10 7 applied and extended Piaget's theories in an effort
104. See id. at 220 (demonstrating abstract relationship between concrete
nouns).
105. See id. at 221 (exploring abstract relationship between abstract nouns).
106. See generally id. at 9-27 (giving overview of theories of intellectual development); GINSBURG & OPPER, supra note 81, at 153-204 (analyzing and critiquing
Piaget and his theory of intellectual development).
107. See Darley & Shultz, supra note 79, at 527 (exploring Kohlberg's contributions to field). Kohlberg's stage theory of moral development has been called a
"landmark" in the field of moral development. See id. It has formed the basis of
hundreds of psychological studies, including dozens of cross-cultural studies testing the universality of the Kohlbergian stages. See, e.g., Hing Keung, The Chinese
Perspectives on Moral Judgment Development, 23 INT'L J. PSVCHOL. 201 (1988) (extending and revising Kohlberg's theory of moral development to integrate Chinese
perspectives); Diomedes Markoulis, Postformal and Postconventional Reasoning in Ed-

ucationally Advanced Adults, 150 J. GENETIC

PSYCHOL.

427 (1989) (examining Stage

Five moral reasoning); John R. Snarey, Cross-CulturalUniversality of Social-MoralDevelopment: A Critical Review of Kohlbergian Research, 97 PSvCHOL. BULL. 202 (1987)
(summarizing and critiquing forty-five cross-cultural studies testing Kohlberg's
theory).
Kohlberg's model has been applied to other fields as well. Kohlberg and
others used the theory to design educational programs to stimulate moral development. See F. CLARK POWER, ANN HIGGINS, & LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, LAWRENCE
KOHLBERG'S APPROACH TO MORAL EDUCATION 1-6 (1989) (describing experimental
schools). The model has also been utilized by political scientists to account for
differences in political belief. See Paul Sparks and Kevin Durkin, Moral Reasoning
and PoliticalOrientation:The Context Sensitivity of Individual Rights andDemocratic Prin-
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to measure people's ability to engage in moral reasoning. He adopted
Piaget's research methods by constructing a series of hypothetical moral

8

0
dilemmas and presenting them to research subjects during interviews.'
For example, Kohlberg asked his subjects whether a man should steal a
drug to save his wife's life, or whether an older brother should tell his
father about a younger brother's disobedience that was revealed in confidence. Kohlberg categorized and evaluated the type of reasoning the subjects employed to answer these and other moral dilemmas.
Kohlberg concluded that moral reasoning, like cognitive reasoning,
could be described as moving through stages of development. Kohlberg
found that people solve moral problems by utilizing relatively consistent
standard patterns of reasoning, and that an individual's pattern of moral
reasoning progresses through stages that are analogous to, although lagging slightly behind, Piaget's stages of cognitive development. 10 9
In addition, Kohlberg, like Piaget, utilized Baldwin's principles of "assimilation" and "accommodation" to describe people's reactions to moral
110
problems and to explain their progression from one stage to another.
Individuals tend to assimilate moral problems by invoking the schema that
is characteristic of their present stage of development. 1 If that schema is
inadequate to successfully resolve the moral problem, the individual is in1 2
fluenced to accommodate his or her pattern of moral reasoning.

Based upon his research, Kohlberg identified three levels of moral
development, each of which consists of two stages:
ciples, 52J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 931, 934-35 (1987) (correlating moral
stage and political orientation); Joseph Wagner, Political Tolerance and Stages of
Moral Development: A Conceptual and EmpiricalAlternative, 8 POLITICAL. BEHAVIOR 45,
74-6 (1986) (correlating moral stage with political tolerance).
Currently, psychologists are considering a competing theory of "information
processing" to explain moral functioning. Recent studies explore the effects of
deficits in information processing on aspects of behavior such as lack of empathy
or aggressiveness. See, e.g., Ersilia Menesini et al., InteractionalStyles of Bullies and
Victims Observed in a Competitive and a Cooperative Setting, 161 J. GENETIC PSYCHOL.
261, 261-65 (2000) (examining bullying as relationship behavior); Laura A.
Thompson et al., Aging and the Effects of Facialand Prosodic Cues on Emotional Intensity
Ratings and Memory Reconstructions, 25J. NONVERBAL BEHIAV. 101, 101-25 (2001) (ex-

amining "young and older adults' interpretation and memory for emotional content of spoken discourse").
108. SeeJOHN MARTIN RIcH &JOsEPH L. DEVITIs, THEORIES OF MORAL DEVEL-

OPMENT 87-104 (1985) (analyzing moral developmental theories, including those
of Kohlberg).
109. See id. at 91-94 (discussing Kohlberg's premise that individual's structure
of moral judgment is embodied in what he or she defines as valuable in moral
issues raised).

110. See Kenneth E. Goodpaster, Kohlbergian Theory: A Philosophical Counterinvention, 92 ETHics 491, 494 (1982) (discussing Kohlberg's theory of moral devel-

opment and stage progression).
11. See RIc-I & DEVITIS, supra note 108, at 87-94 (exploring Kohlberg's claim
that advanced moral reasoning depends upon one's level of logical reasoning).
112. See id. (explaining how individual views on moral judgment evolve from
one's individual perspective).
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Preconventional Level
At this level, the child is responsive to cultural rules and labels of good and bad, right or wrong, but interprets these
labels in terms of either the physical or the hedonistic consequences of action (punishment, reward, exchange of favors)
or in terms of the physical power of those who enunciate the
rules and labels.
Stage 1. The Punishment and Obedience Orientation
Stage 2. The Instrumental Relativist Orientation
Conventional Level
At this level, maintaining the expectations of the individual's
family, group, or nation is perceived as valuable in its own
right, regardless of immediate and obvious consequences.
The attitude is not only one of conformity to personal expectations and social order, but of loyalty to it, of actively maintaining supporting, and justifying the order and of
identifying with the people or group involved in it.
Stage 3. The Interpersonal Concordance or "Good
Boy-Nice Girl" Orientation
Stage 4. Society Maintaining Orientation
Postconventional Level
At this level, there is a clear effort to define moral values and
principles that have validity and application apart from the
authority of the groups or people holding these principles
and apart from the individual's own identification with these
groups.
Stage 5. The Social Contract Orientation
3
Stage 6. The Universal Ethical Principle Orientation.''
113.

LAWRENCE KOHLBERG,

(1981) [hereinafter

THE

PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT

KOHLBERG, MORAL DEVELOPMENT]

17-18

(omitting detailed descrip-

tion of each stage). A more recent description by Kohlberg of each of the six
stages of development is set forth below:
Level 1-Preconventional
Stage 1-Heteronomous Morality-Avoidance of punishment, and
the superior power of authorities.
Stage 2-Individualism, Instrumental Purpose, and Exchange-To
serve one's own needs or interests in a world where you have to recognize that other people have interests, too.
Level 2-Conventional
Stage 3-Mutual Interpersonal Expectations, Relationships, and Interpersonal Conformity-The need to be a good person in your own
eyes and those of others. Your caring for others. Belief in the
Golden Rule. Desire to maintain rules and authority which support
stereotypical good behavior.
Stage 4-Social System and Conscience-To keep the institution going as a whole, to avoid the breakdown in the system "if everyone did
it," or the imperative of conscience to meet one's defined
obligations.
Level 3-Postconventional
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Preconventional thought is essentially egocentric. Right and wrong
are defined by the immediate consequences that will result from the individual's behavior. At Stage 1 of an individual's development, a person's
concern is with reward and punishment. In response to the question of
whether an older brother should tell his father about a younger brother's
disobedience that was revealed in confidence, a ten-year old child stated:
In one way it was right to tell because his father might beat him
up. In another way it's wrong because his brother will beat him
up if he tells.' 14
Three years later, however, at Stage 2, the same child offered a slightly
more complex answer that took into account the possibility that the brothers might agree to keep each other's secrets:
The brother should not tell or he'll get his brother in trouble. If
he wants his brother to keep quiet for him sometime, he'd better
not squeal now.' 15
As the child moves from the preconventional to the conventional
level, the child's conception of morality evolves from commitment to a
"deal" to a sense of "duty." This sense of duty may run to family and
friends or to society as a whole. At Stage 3, the first stage of conventional
thought, the individual is principally concerned with how his family would
feel towards him, and how their feelings would make him feel. This is the
classic "good boy" or "nice girl" approach:
He should think of his brother, but it's more important to be a
good son. Your father has done so much for you. I'd have a
conscience if I didn't tell, more than to my brother, because my
father couldn't trust me. My brother would understand; our fa1 16
ther has done so much for him, too.

Stage 5-Social Contract or Utility and Individual Rights-A sense of
obligation to law because on one's social contract to make and abide
by laws for the welfare of all and for the protection of all people's
rights. A feeling of contractual commitment, freely entered upon, to
family, friendship, trust, and work obligations. Concern that laws
and duties be based on rational calculation of overall utility, "the
greatest good for the greatest number."
Stage 6-Universal Ethical Principles-The belief as a rational person in the validity of universal moral principles, and a sense of personal commitment to them.
LAWRENCE KOHLBERG,

CHILD PSYCHOLOGY AND CHILDHOOD EDUCATION:

TIVE-DEVELOPMENTAL
PSYCHOLOGY].

VIEw

114.

284-86

(1987)

KOHLBERG, CHILD PSYCHOLOGY,

[hereinafter

A

KOHLBERG,

COGNI-

CHILD

supra note 113, at 291 (examining re-

sponses given by children).

115. Id.
116. Id. at 290 (showing emerging of loyalty among siblings).
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At Stage 4, the individual's reasoning is still conventional, but the subject's sense of duty is not limited to the family or immediate peer group.
Instead, the person values law because it promotes social cohesion. This
person, at Stage 4, has assumed the perspective of the "good citizen." To
illustrate this transfer of concern from family to community, here is the
answer of a 17-year-old to the question of whether the husband should
steal the drug to save his wife's life:
It's a matter of law. It's one of the rules that we're trying to help
protect everyone, protect property, not just to protect a store.
It's something that's needed in our society. If we didn't have
these laws people would steal, they wouldn't have to work for a
1 17
living and our whole society would get out of kilter.
Seven years later, the same individual took an even broader perspective, marking the transition to postconventional thinking. In answer to the
same question, this individual stated:
It is the husband's duty to save his wife. The fact that her life is in
danger transcends every other standard you might use to judge
his action. Life is more important than property.1 18

At the postconventional level, instead of accepting the rules of society,
people can question the purposes of the rules and balance these purposes

against other values. They are able to do this because they have acquired a
number of cognitive skills that are characteristic of the Piagetian stage of
formal operations. First, people "become able to juggle more things in
their minds in more complicated ways." ' 19 Second, people can form hypotheses about probable consequences and test them mentally. 1211 Third,
21
people can grasp abstract principles and can assign value to them.'
Fourth, people at the highest stages of cognitive and moral development
embrace the concept of "full reciprocity," that is, that moral rules should
1 22
be applied universally.
117. Id. at 287 (evidencing maturation of ideals).
118. Id. at 290 (showing expansion into postconventional thinking).
119. REST ET AL., supra note 66, at 137 (examining "operations versus
content").
120. See id. at 40-43 (stating that upon one's justification of act, one argues
that act is not self-serving, but serves group goals consistent with principles and
ideals).
121. See id. (stating positive and constructive aspect of postconventional
thinking).
122. Id. at 42 (describing final element of postconventional schema). James
Rest explains the difference between the partial reciprocity of conventional
thought and the full reciprocity of postconventional thought:
Whereas partial reciprocity was envisioned by the maintaining norms
schema (i.e., that everyone alike is under the law and protected by the
law) [conventional thought], at the postconventional level one realizes
that the law itself may be biased; lawful acts may nevertheless favor some
over others (e.g., such was the point of Martin Luther King's civil disobe-

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2003

25

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 1 [2003], Art. 5
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48: p. 305

Postconventional reasoning defines right and wrong by evaluating the
situation in light of the consequences for everyone concerned and the
fundamental values that are at stake. As an individual moves through the
stages of development, he or she acquires the ability to consider the effects
of a decision within an ever-broadening context, from self, to family and
community, to consequences and values that embrace all of mankind.
Kohlberg's theory has been extremely influential, but it has also been
the subject of sustained criticism. Some of the significant critiques of
Kohlberg's work are described in the following section.
C.

Criticisms of Kohlberg's Stage Theory of Development

There are a number of significant challenges to Kohlberg's theory of
moral development. Four principal critiques of Kohlberg's model are discussed below.
1.

Kohlberg's Use of Narrative Responses to Hypothetical Questions

Several researchers have challenged Kohlberg's research methods,
adopted from Piaget, in which subjects are presented with hypothetical
problems in a laboratory setting and their responses are recorded and subjectively scored by the experimenters. 1 23 Some argue that this method
puts a premium on intellectual rationalizing, and is a poor way to gauge
an individual's level of cognitive or moral functioning.124 This criticism
has led researchers in two divergent directions. It has impelled some to
advocate measurement of cognitive or moral behavior rather than verbal
explanation,1 25 while other researchers have devised objective tests (multiple-choice or preference-ranking surveys) to measure the stages of cogni26
tive and moral development.'
dience). "Full" reciprocity entails not only uniform application of social
norms, but also that the social norms themselves not be biased in favor of
some at the expense of others.
Id.
123. For an extended critique of Kohlberg's methods, see
FORD, APPROACHES TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORAL REASONING

PETER

E.

LANC-

191 (1995) ("The

interview is only one of several methods that can be used to study moral
reasoning.").

124. See REST

ET AL.,

supra note 66, at 19-22 (discussing criticism of Kohlberg's

reliance on verbal methods for assessing moraljudgment). Elliott Turiel responds,
however, that Kohlberg had "an abiding concern with judgment, action, and devel-

opment." Elliott Turiel, MoralJudgment, Action, and Development, in THE LEGACY OF
LAWRENCE KOHLBERG 32 (Dawn Schrader ed., 1990) (outlining Kohlberg's impact
in field).
125. See Turiel, supra note 124, at 36-46 (evaluating Kohlberg's emphasis on
"moral aspects of social interactions").

126. See REST

ET AL.,

supra note 66, at 47 (outlining authors' neo-Kolhbergian

approach entitled "Defining Issues Test"); Linda S. Gump et al., The MoralJustification Scale: Reliability and Validity of a New Measure of Care andJustice Orientations,35
ADOLESCENCE

67, 68-70 (2000) (describing development of Moral Justification

Scale).
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The merits of this first criticism, although important in the field of
psychology, are irrelevant to the thesis of this Article. The purpose of this
Article is to describe and sequence the modes of analysis utilized by judges
in formal written opinions. These opinions are not answers to hypothetical problems, but are actual cases. Furthermore, the authors of these
opinions bear a professional obligation to persuade the parties, the profession and society that the decisions are dictated by law. The behavior being
evaluated in this Article is judicial reasoning itself.
2.

The Concept of "Stage"

The second important criticism of these developmental theories relates to the concept of "stage." Many scholars, perhaps most, now reject
the "hard stage" model favored by Piaget and Kohlberg. The stage concept grew out of Baldwin's biological orientation, and was embraced by
Piaget, whose original academic pursuit was zoology. 1 2 7 Consistent with
this biological perspective, Piaget understood cognitive and moral development to proceed in an "invariant sequence," 128 and Kohlberg, as one
group of scholars explains, "advocated a particularly strong version of the
'stage' concept:"' 29
The underlying metaphor for [Kohlberg's] notion of development was the staircase: Development consists of moving up the
staircase one step at a time. Kohlberg contended that subjects
were "in" one stage or another (i.e., on one "step" or another).
Every subject would show stepwise, irreversible, upward progression in the stage sequence in longitudinal studies, with no stage
skipping or reversals (one moves up the staircase one step at a
130
time, and always forward).
Researchers have challenged this understanding of stages as invariably sequenced discrete steps. Studies indicate that people may exhibit different stages of cognitive or moral development in response to different
problems.131 Rather than assign an individual to a single stage of development, some researchers now seek to measure
127. See GINSBURG & OPPER, supra note 81, at 1-2 (describing Piaget's early

years).
128. Id. at 158 (detailing Piaget's notion of stages).
129. REST ET AL., supra note 66, at 17 (discussing "problems with the 'stage'
concept").
130. Id. (exploring difficulties with Kohlberg's use of stages).
131. See GINSBURG & OPPER, supra note 81, at 159 (noting one difficulty of

stage notion as existence of irregularities in development). "[T]he child is not
always in the same stage with regard to different areas of thought ....

Also ...

the

child may display different levels of achievement in regard to very similar areas of
thought." Id. "Certain tasks, which appeared to share the same logical structure,
were found to be passed at widely different ages ....
[and] correlations among
developmental tasks were often low or insignificant." CASE, supra note 68, at 27
(reporting problematic data).
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[t] he degree to which the individual uses various types of thinking. Developmental sequence therefore is not a matter of a person abruptly changing from stage to stage (going up a staircase,
step by step), but a matter of shifting distributions of stage use
(using less of the lower stages and more of the higher stages of
thinking). 132
Although the invariant and discrete nature of "hard stages" may not
be supported by psychological research, there are other aspects of the
stage concept that are broadly accepted. First, the stages of development
appear sequentially, if gradually. Second, the stages are differentiated in
the sense that each stage is characterized by a distinct "underlying structure."' 33 Third, each stage of development "prepares the way" for the
stage to follow.' 3 " The stage theory presented in this Article reflects this

notion of "soft stages," mental operations that appear sequentially, that
can be distinguished from each other structurally and that build upon
each other to create increasingly complex forms.
3.

Multiplicity

Kohlberg originally believed that he could derive fundamental moral
truths, i.e., "right answers," at Stage 6, the highest stage of moral reasoning. However, Kohlberg eventually abandoned Stage 6 as a separate category, finding no evidence for its existence. 135 James Rest and his
colleagues, self-described "Neo-Kohlbergians," define postconventional
thought as follows:
The defining characteristic of postconventional thinking is that
rights and duties are based on sharable ideals for organizing cooperation in society, and are open to debate and tests of logical
consistency, experience of the community, and coherence with
accepted practice.'

36

132. REST ET AL., supra note 66, at 56 (discussing assessment of developmental
progress as more than simply qualitative analysis).
133. See GINSBURG & OPPER, supra note 81, at 158 (discussing "concept of a
stage").
134. See id. (stating that, in cases of conservation, initial centration prepares
for vacillation among available dimension leading to subsequent decentration).
135. See Paul T. Wangerin, Objective, Multiplistic, and Relative Truth in DevelopmentalPsychology and Legal Education, 62 TUL. L. REv. 1237, 1274-77 (1988) (discussing Kohlberg's stages of moral development and elimination of Stage Six). The
collapse of Kohlberg's stage 6 (universality) into stage 5 (utilitarian balancing) is
consistent with John Harsanyi's conclusion that rational morality is based upon
rule utilitarianism. "If we care about the common good, then reason will clearly
tell us what moral code to follow: it will tell us to follow the rule utilitarian moral
code." John C. Harsanyi, Does Reason Tell Us What Moral Code to Follow and, Indeed, to
Follow Any Moral Code at All?, 96 ETHICS 42, 55 (1985) (discussing relationship between "rationality and morality").
136. REST ET AL., supra note 66, at 40-43 (discussing four elements that make
up postconventional schema).
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Rest contends that postconventional thought is not characterized by
adherence to a single school of moral philosophy, but by the ability to
utilize moral philosophy to evaluate society. 137 According to Rest, conven138
tional moral thinking is "the morality of maintaining social norms,"
whereas postconventional moral thinking is "the morality that rules, roles,
39
laws, and institutions must serve some shareable ideal of cooperation."1
Paul Wangerin addresses this fundamental disagreement about the
nature of postconventional thought in his article Objective, Multiplistic, and
Relative Truth in Developmental Psychology and Legal Education, which is the
most comprehensive treatment of the developmental theories of Piaget
and Kohlberg in legal scholarship to date. 140 Wangerin describes the
137. See id. (clarifying that postconventional thought is not defined by any
single philosophy, but is broad and less partisan).
138. Id. at 2 (noting devlopment in thinking toward postconventional from
conventional).
139. Id. (highlighting "[t]he shift from conventional to postconventional
thinking" as growing awareness of how people interrelate among new concern with
morality).
140. See Wangerin, supra note 135, at 1273-89 (discussing both Piaget and
Kohlberg's developmental theories). A number of researchers have evaluated the
moral reasoning of attorneys and law students using the Kohlbergian scale. See
NinaJ. Crimm, A Study: Law School Students' Moral Perspectives in the Context of Advocacy and Decision-Making Roles, 29 NEw ENG. L. REV. 1, 14-15 (1994) (discussing
Kohlberg's model of moral reasoning); Susan Daicoff, Articles Lawyer, Know Thyself.
A Review of EmpiricalResearch on Attorney Attributes Bearing on Professionalism,46 AM.
U. L. REV. 1337, 1396-99 (1997) [hereinafter Daicoff, Know Thysel]] (discussing
analysis of Kohlberg's theory of moral development); Susan Daicoff, (Oxymoron?)
Ethical Decisionmaking by Attorneys: An Empirical Study, 48 FLA. L. REv. 197, 203-06
(1996) [hereinafter Daicoff, Ethical Decisionmaking] (discussing Kohlberg's theory
of moral development with regards to moral and ethical attorney decisionmaking);
SandraJanoff, The Influence of Legal Education on Moral Reasoning, 76 MINN. L. REV.
193, 196-99 (1991) (discussing Kohlberg's expansion of Piaget's scheme). Psychologists have also examined the effect of moral stage on juror decisionmaking. See
Michael B. Lubfer et al., The Influence of Level of Moral Reasoning on the Decisions of
Jurors, 127J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 653, 657-67 (1987) (discussing results of four experiments conducted to assess influence of cognitive and attitudinal factors on decisions reached by individual jurors when asked to deliberate on simulated trial).
Scholars have investigated the relation between the "moral stage" of adolescents and their interaction with the legal system, including their competency to
stand trial, the validity of their consent to search and their behavior as mock jurors. See Adele M. Ackerman et.al., Defendant CharacteristicsandJudgment Behaviors
of Adolescent Mock Jurors, 13J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 123, 128-29 (1984) (reporting
findings on impact of certain evidence on adolescent jurors and relating this to
moral judgment); Thomas Grisso, The Competence of Adolescents as TrialDefendants, 3
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 3, 10-11 (1997) (considering moral stage and ability to
stand trial along with children's preconventional view of rights as bestowed by authority); Lourdes M. Rosado, Minors and the Fourth Amendment: How Juvenile Status
Should Invoke Different Standardsfor Searches and Seizures on the Street, 71 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 762, 787-90 (1996) (discussing need forjuvenile standard for consent); see also
Robert Batey, The Rights of Adolescents, 23 WM. & MARY L. REv. 363, 370-83 (1982)
(discussing adolescents' decision-making capacities).
In addition, scholars have discussed the influence of Kohlberg's theory on the
"discourse ethics" of Jurgen Habermas. See Myra Bookman, Still Facing "The Dilemma of the Fact": Gilligan and Habermas (Re)Visited, 76 DENV. U. L. REv. 977, 983-87
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schism in the field of developmental psychology between those theorists
who, like Kohlberg, reject multiplicity and relativism, and those who embrace it. 141 He also observes a similar schism in the field of legal education. 142 Drawing on educational theorists, Wangerin argues persuasively
that "the transition between dualistic and relativistic thinking is the most
difficult instructional moment faced by students," 143 and that "studies suggest that as students move through law school, they rapidly develop an
increased ability to see various sides of an issue and increased tolerance
44
for ambiguity."1
4.

The Ethic of Care

A related criticism of Kohlberg's theory, and one that has similar implications for the substance of his model of moral development, is that his
reliance on the cognitive aspect of moral reasoning fails to account for the
(1999) (looking at researchers' consideration of "discourse ethics"); Craig Calhoun, Social Theory and the Law: Systems Theory, Normative Justification, and
Postmodernism, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 398, 415-33 (1989) (discussing Habermas's discourse ethics); Mark Gould, Law and Philosophy: Some Consequencesfor the Law Deriving from the Sociological Reconstruction of Philosophical Theory, 17 CARDOzo L. REV.
1239, 1257-59 (1996) (exploring Habermas's emphasis that cultural values must be
tested from outside perspectives); Evan Simpson, The Development of PoliticalReasoning, 30 HUMAN DEV. 268, 269-80 (1987) (discussing Kohlberg's schema of moral
development, as well as Piaget's, regarding how its impact on political attitudes).
One scholar uses Kohlbergian analysis to criticize thejurisprudential school of
"law and economics," equating it with preconventional reasoning. See Jeffrey L.
Harrison, Egoism, Altruism, and Market Illusions: The Limits of Law and Economics, 33
UCLA L. REV. 1309, 1323 (1986) (examining self-interest of economics).
Legal scholars have made fruitful use of Carol Gilligan's model of moral development, the "ethic of care," which has provided a scientific basis for feminist critical scholarship. For a complete discussion of Gilligan's "ethic of care," see infra
notes 151-68 and accompanying text.
141. See Wangerin, supra note 135, at 1288-1300 (noting different perspectives
on theories within developmental psychology). Wangerin explains:
An enormous schism that divides the various schools of developmental psychology can now be clearly seen. Lawrence Kohlberg does not accept multiplicity or relativism as the underlying epistemological stance
that climaxes moral development, nor do Professors Kitchener and King,
the originators of the cognitive development theory of reflective judgment. These theorists insist that certain universally applicable and objectively true ideas and principles do exist. For them, development involves
movement toward acceptance of that fact. Thus, they follow in the tradition of Plato. Conversely, William Perry for the cognitive development
psychologists and Norma Haan for the moral development psychologists
believe that objective truth does not exist and that development principally involves the ability to live with that uncomfortable fact. In a sense,
therefore, they follow in the tradition of Protagoras.
Id. at 1287-88.
142. See id. at 1288 (examining varying views on legal education theories).
143. Id. at 1255 (commenting on pain and anxiety experienced by law
students).
144. Id. at 1254-55 (arguing that law students' greatest challenges are necessary shifts in thinking modes).
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emotional nature of morality. Many leading scholars have persuasively argued that Kohlberg ignored the role of empathy in favor of a cognitive
145
approach that emphasizes individual commitment to abstract rights.
14
6
James Rest argues that Kohlberg, like Immanuel Kant
and John
Rawls, 1 4 7 attempted to "[construct] a moral point of view solely from rational imagination." 148 Rest observes that "[c]ritics of Kohlberg claim that
his stage sequence favors abstract, impartial principles over loyalty, friendship and close relationships." 149 In contrast, for many people, the essence
of morality is to fulfill responsibilities to the people who depend upon
them: their spouses, their children, their co-workers, patients, clients, students, customers, neighbors and friends. The advocates of empathy and
caring contend that Kohlberg undervalues the importance of responsibil0
ity and emotional concerns.15
This critique, denominated "the ethic of care," was forcefully articulated by Kohlberg's onetime student and colleague Carol Gilligan. 1 5 1 Her
groundbreaking work, In a Different Voice, argued that Kohlberg's analysis
was flawed because it was drawn solely from a male perspective. In particular, Dr. Gilligan argues that: "Kohlberg's six stages that describe the development of moral judgment from childhood to adulthood are based
empirically on a study of eighty-four boys whose development Kohlberg
1 52
has followed for a period of over twenty years."

145. SeeJustin D'Arms, Empathy and Evaluative Inquiry, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1467, 1468-70 (2000) (affirming proposition that empathy is important as precursor to or motivator of moral behavior); Lynne Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85
Mici-i. L. Rv. 1574, 1578 (1987) (discussing empathy as phenomenon that exists
to expand understanding of others); Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling,
and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old Wounds, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2099, 2100 (1989)
(discussing empathy as related to more individualized justice and as model for
encouraging attorneys to pay attention to unique life stories of their clients).
146. One formulation of Kant's categorical imperative is: "Act as if the maxim
of your action were to become through your will a general natural law." Immanuel
Kant, Microsoft Encarta Online Encyclopedia 2002 (outlining Kant's life and accomplishments), availableat http://encarta.msn.com/find/Concise.asp?z=l &pg=2
&ti=761560445&cid=6#p6 (last visited Aug. 30, 2002).
147. Rawls's ingenious metaphor, the "veil of ignorance," invites us to construct rules of morality with perfect knowledge of the human condition, but without particular knowledge of our own station in life. SeeJOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 136-42 (1971) (asserting that parties do not know how alternatives will affect their own particular case and are forced to evaluate principles solely on general considerations).
148. REST ET AL., supra note 66, at 17 (outlining problems with Kolhberg's
"stage" theory).
149. See id. at 5 (presenting outline of criticisms of Kohlberg's theories).
150. See id. (pointing at Kohlberg advocates' loyalty to abstractions over loyalty to persons).
151. See Mark F. Goldberg, Restoring Lost Voices: An Interview With CarolGilligan,
81 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 701, 701-04 (May 2000) (noting Gilligan's critique of
Kohlberg); RiCH & DEVITIS, supra note 108, at 117-20 (exploring Gilligan's work in
light of her mentor Kohlberg).
152. GILLIGAN, supra note 99, at 18 (criticizing Kohlberg's omission of females
from his research). "[Gilligan] suggests that Kohlberg's scoring system may be

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2003

31

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 1 [2003], Art. 5
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48: p. 305

According to Gilligan, Kohlberg relegated women's moral orientation
to Stage 3, characterizing caring and attentiveness to personal relationships as less mature than concern with "rights":
Prominent among those who thus appear to be deficient in
moral development when measured by Kohlberg's scale are women, whose judgments seem to exemplify the third stage of his
six stage sequence. At this stage morality is conceived in interpersonal terms and goodness is equated with helping and pleasing others. This conception of goodness is considered by
Kohlberg and Kramer to be functional in the lives of mature wo153
men insofar as their lives take place in the home.
Under Gilligan's model of moral development, people progress from
conventional to postconventional thought not solely because they have advanced cognitively, but because they have acquired a deeper and broader
sense of empathy. The "good boy" or "nice girl" of Stage 3, who desires to
please his or her family and friends may evolve into a person who is sensitive to the interests and the values of others generally. In a similar manner, the "good citizen" of Stage 4, who identifies with the social norms of
the community, may evolve into an autonomous citizen capable of evaluating the effect of the laws and institutions of his or her society on all
15 4
persons.
Gilligan asserts that Kohlberg, by focusing entirely on rational analysis, missed the "heart" of moral reasoning. 155 Gilligan contends that

biased against women because of the disproportionate numbers of males in research samples and that the developmental theories themselves tend to be formulated by men." RICH & DEVITIS, supra note 108, at 96 (discussing Gilligan's
assertion that Kohlberg's theory is biased against women because research sample
was disproportionately male and theory was formulated by male).
153. GILLIGAN, supra note 99, at 18 (applying Kohlberg's theory to females).
"Gilligan notes that Kohlberg found women, in light of their strong interpersonal
orientation, to favor Stage 3, a stage he held to be functional and adequate for
them. She laments that the traits that have conventionally defined the 'goodness'
of women - their care and sensitivity to the needs of others - are those that mark
them as deficient in moral development." RIcH & DEVITIS, supra note 108, at 96
(discussing Gilligan's disappointment that traits which conventionally defined
"goodness" of women are used by Kohlberg to mark them deficient in moral

development).
154. This conception of the transition from conventional to postconventional
thought is consistent with the influential "domain theory" of Elliott Turiel, who
contends that conventional and postconventional thinking belong to separate domains, and that they evolve on parallel tracks. See REST ET AL, supra note 66, at 146
(discussing Turiel's theories on conventional and postconventional thinking as alternative to Kohlberg).
155. See GILLIGAN, supra note 99, at 23 (arguing that, until acknowledgement
is made of importance of attachment in human life cycle within women's development, thei theories remain limited).
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moral problems arise "from conflicting responsibilities rather than from
competing rights":'

56

This conception of morality as concerned with the activity of care
centers moral development around the understanding of responsibility and relationships, just as the conception of morality as
fairness ties moral development to the understanding of rights
and rules.

1 57

In her signature work, Gilligan analyzed women's approaches to
resolving a number of moral decisions with interpersonal dimensions such
as whether to have an abortion,158 whether to marry a boyfriend 5 9 or how
to react to a family member's suicide.' 60 Gilligan determined that, in
these contexts, women analyze problems in terms of the effect that their
decision would have on themselves and their loved ones, and not on the
basis of legal rights and rules.' 6 1 Gilligan's theory has spawned an outpouring of scholarship on feminist legal theory.' 62 As a result, the role of
156. Id. (arguing that different constructions of moral problems by women is
critical reason why they fail to develop within Kohlberg's system).
157. Id. (describing how conception of morality for women is different because men focus on human rights and emphasize separation rather than connection thus, relationships for men are secondary to individual).
158. See id. at 71-105 (discussing conflict women experience when considering abortion).
159. See id. at 134-35 (reflecting one woman's view on morality and marriage).
160. See id. at 137-38 (discussing viewpoints on morality of suicide).
161. Id. at 19 (discussing how women differ and why they fail to develop
within other theorist's systems). Gilligan relies on research studies showing that
"the moral judgments of women differ from those of men in the greater extent to
which women's judgments are tied to feelings of empathy and compassion .... "
Id. at 69. Critics of Gilligan's work contend that interpersonal aspects dominate
the decision-making of the women she interviewed because the domain of the
problems they faced were interpersonal in nature. See, e.g., REST ET AL., supra note
66, at 10 (pointing out Gilligan's assumptions and focus on some phenomena
while ignoring others). For example, James Rest suggests that Kohlberg's theory
of moral reasoning applies to questions of "macromorality," that is the morality of
society as reflected in its laws and rules, while Gilligan's "ethic of care" applies to
questions of "micromorality," that is, the morality of questions of friendship, family
and individual choice. See id. at 2-3 (arguing that conditions for establishing society-made system requires impartiality and acting on shared ideals, not acting on
behalf of our friends and kin). The weakness of this criticism of Gilligan's thesis is
that Kohlberg's moral dilemmas were also presented to subjects as questions of
family, friendship and individual choice. The examples of whether to steal a drug
for one's wife or whether to tell on a younger brother are every bit as personal as
whether to have an abortion or whether to marry.
162. See, e.g., Stephen Ellmann, The Ethic of Care as an EthicforLawyers, 81 GEO.
L.J. 2665, 2667 (1993) (considering how Gilligan's ethic of care might alter contours of lawyer's ethical responsibilities); Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral:
The Ethics of Feminism and ClinicalEducation,75 MINN. L. REV. 1599, 1609-14 (1991)
(looking at feminist reading of Antigone); Pamela S. Karlan & Daniel R. Ortiz, In a
Diffident Voice: RelationalFeminism, Abortion Rights, and the Feminist Legal Agenda, 87
Nw. U. L. REv. 858, 858-62 (1992) (questioning prominence of relational feminism
by showing its tension with needs of many women); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue
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empathy in the interpretation of the law has received increased attention
from legal scholars.' 63
Researchers have investigated Gilligan's thesis that preferences for
'justice" versus "caring" correlate with gender, but the results of these
studies are divided. '6 4 Whether or not the "ethic of care" is gender-based,
there are powerful arguments to support the conclusion that the ability to
empathize with others is an important constituent of moral reasoning.
There is now substantial evidence to support the conclusion that small
children have the capacity to empathize, that people's ability to empathize
with others develops over time and that empathy may be conceived as an
ever-widening and ever-deepening phenomenon. 1 6 5 At the most advanced levels of development, the ethic of caring may encompass a number of philosophic outlooks because the essence of caring is the ability to
see a problem from many different viewpoints. 16 Gilligan refers to this as
the "postconventional ethic of care." 167 Myra Bookman describes Gilligan's contribution as "a moral stage that transcends both the impediments
of conventional ethical life and the empty formalisms of abstract reason
and replaces both with an awareness of need and avoidance of detachand the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REv. 543, 543-44
(1986) (discussing women's perspectives on world as being more closely aligned
with classical Republican theory); Paul J. Spiegelman, Integrating Doctrine, Theory
and Practice in the Law School Curriculum: The Logic of Jake's Ladder in the Context of
Amy's Web, 38 J. LEGAL EDUc. 243, 247 (1988) (using Gilligan's work on moral
development to find ways of integrating doctrine, practice and theory in classroom);Joan Chalmers Williams, Dissolvingthe Sameness/DifferenceDebate: A Post-Modern Path Beyond Essentialism in Feminist and Critical Race Theory, 1991 DUKE L.J. 296,
300 (1991) (arguing that outsider jurisprudence and feminist narrative have
greater potential for offering useful descriptions of difference than relational feminists). Legal scholars have made creative use of Gilligan's context-sensitive "ethic
of care." For example, Paul Spiegelman suggested that the adoption of this orientation wouldjustily profound changes in legal education. See Spiegelman, supra,at
255-61 (referring to example of Amy and Jake, two 11-year-old children with contrasting approaches to moral decision-making described in Gilligan's work).
163. See Henderson, supra note 145, at 1578-86 (discussing relationship between empathy and moral choice).
164. See Gump et al., supra note 126, at 2 (examining both Gilligan's and
Kohlberg's work). One scholar, summarizing these studies, concludes:
Using measures designed to investigate more interpersonally oriented
forms of moral reasoning, a number of studies have found gender differences, with males primarily focusing on issues of justice and females primarily focusing on interpersonal issues. However, other studies have not
found significant differences.
Id. (referencing division in 'justice" versus "caring" studies).

165. See

REST ET AL.,

supra note 66, at 22-23 (noting that children can em-

pathize). Researchers have observed that adolescents shift "from a personal perspective to a sociocentric perspective." Id. at 39.
166. Cf Wangerin, supra note 135, at 1293 (noting that caring voice "is abstractly related to multiplicity and relativism").
167. Carol Gilligan & John Michael Murphy, Development from Adolescence to

Adulthood: The Philosopherand the Dilemma of the Fact, in INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT
BEYOND CHILDHOOD 85, 86 (Deanna Kuhn ed., 1979) (discussing philosophical
outcome of ethic of care).
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ment."1 68 For these reasons, the "ethic of care" is a powerful component
of postconventional moral reasoning.
Accordingly, Kohlberg's stage theory of moral development must be
adjusted in three principal ways in order to describe the stages of legal
reasoning. First, the stages of reasoning should be described as "soft
stages"-which are sequential, structurally distinct and increasingly complex-and not as "hard stages"-which are invariant and hierarchical.
Formalism, analogy and realism appear sequentially, are structurally distinct and are increasingly complex, but all are necessary for the law to
evolve, and none of these methods of reasoning is inherently superior to
the others.
Second, postconventional thought is not characterized by the adoption of a single philosophic outlook, such as the philosophy of Immanuel
Kant or John Rawls. Instead, postconventional thought, like realist analysis, is characterized by the ability to critique laws and institutions by reference to any one of a number of philosophic tools, including the
consideration of consequences and fundamental values.
Third, postconventional thought utilizes not only increasingly complex cognitive functions, but also draws upon an increased capacity for
empathetic awareness, which grows out of the more parochial desires for
acceptance and identity that emerge at the level of conventional thought.
Both logic and empathy play a fundamental role in the postconventional
ability to evaluate laws and institutions.
With these three clarifications or modifications to Kohlberg's developmental theory in mind, we now return to a description of the stages of
legal reasoning.
D.

The Stages of Legal Reasoning

In light of the fact that both cognitive and moral reasoning exhibit
distinct stages of development, we should expect legal reasoning, which is
the confluence of logical and moral reasoning, to exhibit a similar stage
structure. We should not expect to find, in a judicial opinion, childish
forms of reasoning reflective of preoperational or preconventional
thought. We should not, however, be surprised to find a combination of
concrete and formal operations, as well as conventional and postconventional thought. I suggest that formalism, analogy and realism may be characterized as the stages of legal reasoning for the following reasons.
First, the cognitive elements of formalism, analogy and realism appear sequentially in correspondence with stages of development described
by Piaget and Kohlberg. Formalism-the understanding and application
of rules-is mastered at the level of "Concrete Operations" under Piaget's
theory, and represents "Conventional Reasoning" in Kohlberg's model of
moral development. Children also acquire the ability to construct con168. Bookman, supra note 140, at 982 (examining Gilligan's work).
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crete analogies (formalist analogies) at the level of Concrete Operations
and can draw analogies based on abstract relations and abstract terms (realist analogies) later in adolescence, as they master Formal Operations.
To engage in realist analysis, a person must be able to understand abstractions, frame hypotheses and consider multiple abstract aspects of a problem at the same time. These are the same cognitive operations that are
characteristic of Formal Operations and Postconventional thought.
Kohlberg observed the same progression stating: "Paralleling evidence on
universal moral levels, the development of individual orientations vis-A-vis
legal or rule systems shows consistent movement from a preconventional
law-obeying, to a conventional law-maintaining, to a postconventional law'1 69
making perspective."
Second, not only do reasoning by analogy and realistic analysis
emerge sequentially in the individual because they call upon increasingly
complex cognitive skills, but they also require a broader and more sensitive ability to empathize with others.17 ° This is emblematic of the Kohlbergian notion of "full reciprocity"1 71 or Gilligan's "postconventional ethic of
care." 172 A critical component of reasoning by analogy is identifying the
similarities and differences among cases, and a crucial step in realist analysis is imagining how people will be affected by the interpretation of the
law. Todd Brower eloquently explains how judges' lack of empathy has
hampered their ability to fairly apply precedent to gays and lesbians:
An important component of the study of case precedent and reasoning by analogy is the ability to recognize when things are
meaningfully similar or dissimilar and to treat them accordingly.
As gay rights issues proliferate in the courts, however, judges and
lawyers seem to have forgotten how to determine similarity and
difference. Cases that are otherwise similar are decided differ173
ently when they involve lesbians and gay men.
Empathetic awareness-the "ethic of care"-plays a central role in realist
analogies and realist analysis.
Third, each stage of legal reasoning is incorporated into and prepares
the way for the succeeding stage. One must be able to apply a rule according to its terms before one can apply it to analogous cases. One must be
able to identify factual similarities between one situation and another
169. June Louin Tapp & Lawrence Kohlberg, Developing Senses of Law and LegalJustice, in LAW, JUSTICE AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIETY 89 (June Louin Tapp &

Felice J. Levine eds., 1977) (noting research on development of legal perspective).

170. See generally D'Arms, supra note 145, at 1470 (stating that empathy "is a
device for learning about what matters and why").
171. For a further discussion of analogical reasoning, see supra notes 39-57
and accompanying text.
172. For further discussion of modes of thinking concerning relationships
and human development, see supra notes 68-122 and accompanying text.
173. Brower, supra note 47, at 66 (discussing difficulty faced by judges in cases
involving gays and lesbians).
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before one can identify similarities in the values or interests that are at
stake. Finally, one must be able to identify the relevant values that are at
stake in a situation before one is able to evaluate their relative likelihood
and weight. Thus, formalism, formalist analogies, realist analogies and realism represent an evolution of successively more complex modes of
reasoning.
Fourth, according to the theory of assimilation and accommodation,
we progress from one stage to another when an existing schema is inadequate to resolve the case at hand. I argue in the following portion of this
Article that this is precisely what happens in hard legal cases. When a
court is faced with a novel fact situation, or in cases where the values of
society are in flux, the courts of necessity tend to employ all three methods
of legal reasoning. First, the courts attempt to apply existing rules of law
to new facts; this is the deductive, formalistic approach. Under this approach, the courts try to clarify any ambiguities in an existing rule by defining the terms of the rule. If the ambiguities in the rule cannot be
resolved through the definition of terms,' 74 courts turn to the second approach and attempt to apply existing rules of law by analogy to the case
under consideration.' 75 If the facts of the case under consideration are so
novel that the analogies break down, 176 courts turn to the third approach
in order to decide the case.' 77 Through an inductive, realist approach,
the courts devise new rules of law by balancing the relevant values and
interests.
174. As Richard Warner notes, the problem with a deductive approach is that
the minor premise of a legal syllogism is frequently in question. For instance,
"[t] he question is whether 'the cumulative effect of a series of connected, or independent negligent acts' add up to recklessness. It is difficult to cast the court's
reasoning about this point in deductive form for the relevant rule seems not to
exist." Warner, supra note 13, at 1553 (noting frailties of deductive reasoning).
175. See State v. Flynn, 55 P.3d 324, 347 (Kan. 2002) (describing evidence in
case as "relevant by analogy"); Gunaji v. Macias, 31 P.3d 1008, 1010 (N.M. 2001)
(stating that proper remedy should be determined by drawing analogy to Code).
Scott Brewer states the first step of analogical reasoning occurs:
in a context of doubt about the extension of some predicate or the meaning of some text; probably the most typical "contexts of doubt" in legal
arguments are instances in which a legal concept or term is actively
vague-that is, instances in which a judge or lawyer is undecided about
whether to apply the concept to a given object or event.
Brewer, supra note 45, at 962 (summarizing model of exemplary reasoning).
176. Todd Brower suggests:
[T]he most opportune time for change appears to be when the existing
schema ceases to function adequately; that is, when the schema does not
properly represent factual circumstances or generate legal outcomes consistent with appropriate precedent.
Brower, supra note 47, at 145-46.
177. As Larry Alexander has observed: "[1]n the uncontrolled case, where no
canonical legal norm or precedent governs . . . lawyers employ moral or policy
arguments." Alexander, supra note 42, at 517 (noting occasions when lawyers resort to policy arguments).
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In the following section, I present evidence to support the argument
that in hard cases the reasoning of the courts progresses from formalism,
to analogy and, finally, to realism.
II.

THE STAGES OF LEGAL REASONING IN HARD CASES

Technological capability and social understanding are advancing at
ever-increasing rates, and the law must adapt to each new state of affairs.
As Justice William Brennan stated:
The mists which have obscured the light of freedom and equality
for countless tens of millions are dissipating. For the unity of the
human family is becoming more and more distinct on the horizon of human events. The gradual civilization of all people replacing the civilization of only the elite, the rise of mass
education and mass media of communication, the formulation of
new thought structures due to scientific advances and social
178
evolution-all these phenomena hasten that day.
Like James Mark Baldwin, Brennan believed in human progress and
attributed this progress to the development of "new thought structures"
that have been and are being evolved. 179 Changes in the patterns of legal
reasoning have become apparent because the "hydraulic pressure" that
technological and social change exert on the law works to reveal the underlying structure of legal thinking. 8 0° As new facts force changes in legal
paradigms, the different types of legal reasoning are thrown into bold relief. In particular, judges progress from formalism to analogy to realism
when resolving difficult questions of law.
David Friedman has observed that:
Technological change affects the law in at least three ways: (1) by
altering the cost of violating and enforcing existing legal rules;
(2) by altering the underlying facts thatjustify legal rules; and (3)
by changing the underlying facts implicitly assumed by the law,
making existing legal concepts and categories obsolete, even
meaningless." 8
In a similar vein, Steven Quevedo has identified three ways in which a
rule or an analogy can "age" and require revision or replacement: (1)
When "new cases have materially different facts;" (2) "if the factual assumptions upon which the analogy is based become more and more sus-

178.

WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., AN AFFAIR WITH FREEDOM

319 (StevenJ. Fried-

man ed., 1967) (discussing changing face of society).
179. See William J. Brennan, Jr., How Goes the Supreme Court?, 36 MERCER L.
Ruv. 781, 786 (1985) (discussing evolution of constitutional doctrine).
180. Id. (stating that political and cultural differences cannot stop progress,
which compels field of law to rethink its role).
181. David Friedman, Does Technology Require New Law?, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 71, 71 (2002) (discussing how technology is changing law).
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pect as time passes;" and (3) "if the value or policy assumptions governing
the selection of the relevant similarity or difference are called into
question." 182
During the last half of the Twentieth Century, technological advances
intwo fields have had a particularly significant impact on the way we live.
The telecommunications revolution has opened up a new world of information and entertainment, while innovations in reproductive technology
have created new ways to conceive and bear children. The social changes
created by these technological advances have in turn generated a host of
new legal problems. I examine below how changes in telecommunications
have required a reexamination of the First Amendment, and how the new
reproductive technology has affected the law of parentage.
A.

The First Amendment and Telecommunications: From Doctrine to Balancing

In recent years the Supreme Court has decided a number of cases
applying the First Amendment to new forms of communication-includ18 5
4
ing cable television, 18 3 the Internet' 8 and computer-generated images.
Over a half century ago, Justice Robert Jackson noted that First Amendment doctrine is particularly sensitive to technological change, because
each new form of media has different characteristics.' 8 6 He stated "[t] he
moving picture screen, the radio, the newspaper, the handbill, the sound
truck, and the street corner orator have differing natures, values, abuses,
1 87
and dangers.
182. Steven M. Quevedo, Formalistand Instrumentalist Legal Reasoning and Legal
Theory, 73 CAL. L. REV. 119, 144-45 (1985) (examining how legal concepts can
"age").
183. See United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 826-27
(2000) (invalidating provision of Telecommunications Act of 1996 which required
cable operators to either "fully scramble" sexually explicit channels or to limit their
hours of transmission); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 216-17
(1997) (upholding "must-carry" provisions of Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992).
184. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 122 S.Ct. 1700, 1713-14 (2002) (considering
whether it is constitutional to evaluate whether postings on Internet are "harmful
to minors" on basis of "contemporary community standards"); Reno v. ACLU, 521
U.S. 844, 876-83 (1997) (invalidating provisions of Communications Decency Act
of 1996, which attempted to protect minors from "indecent" and "patently offensive" speech on Internet).
185. SeeAshcroftv. Free Speech Coalition, 112 S. Ct. 1389, 1405 (2002) (holding that Congress could not outlaw computer generated images of child
pornography).
186. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(noting that each method of "communication of ideas" has different
characteristics).
187. Id. at 94 (Jackson, J., concurring) (noting relationship between First
Amendment and technology). Two scholars concluded, however, that technological change may be simply an excuse, and not a reason, for changing the law: "the
rhetoric of technological change provides freedom-a freedom that can be exploited to advance [the judge's] particular jurisprudential agendas." Monroe E.
Price &John F. Duffy, Technological Change and DoctrinalPersistence: Telecommunica-
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Has the rapid change in communications technology had an effect on
First Amendment jurisprudence generally? In the past two terms alone,
the Court has decided eleven First Amendment cases.' 88 The most striking aspect of the Court's recentjurisprudence in this area is the increasing
tendency of the Court to reject established doctrine in place of a balancing approach. Of course, balancing approaches are nothing new to First
Amendment jurisprudence. The "clear and present danger" test, developed by Oliver Wendell Holmes, 189 and Learned Hand's standard, which
took into account "the gravity of the 'evil' discounted by its improbability,"'190 both called for judicial balancing. What is different about the
Court's recent cases is its abandonment of standard balancing formulas,
such as strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny, in favor of ad hoc balancing tests.
Until recently, the classic paradigm for First Amendment analysis had
been for the Court to address a number of threshold issues and, depending on the how these questions were answered, to set a standard of review.
The principal threshold issue under the First Amendment is whether the
lions Reform in Congress and the Court, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 976, 1009 (1997) (sug-

gesting that judges feel more comfortable modifying doctrine to account for
technological change rather than change in legal theory).
188. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 122 S. Ct. 2528, 2542 (2002)
(holding Minnesota Supreme Court canon of judicial conduct unconstitutional);

Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc'y of New York v. Stratton, Ohio, 122 S.Ct. 2080,

2091 (2002) (holding that ordinances requiring permit for door-to-door religious
solicitation violated First Amendment); Ashcroft, 122 S.Ct.at 1713-14 (holding that
Child Online Protection Act was not unconstitutionally overbroad); Los Angeles v.
Alameda Books, Inc., 122 S.Ct. 1728, 1735-39 (2002) (holding that city could reasonably rely on police department study correlating crime patterns with concentration of adult businesses when businesses brought First Amendment challenge); Free
Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. at 1405 (holding computer generated child pornographic images protected by First Amendment); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,
533 U.S. 525, 569 (2001) (holding that regulation prohibiting advertisement of
smokeless tobacco violated First Amendment); Fed. Elec. Comm'n v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 465-82 (2001) (holding that coordinated campaign expenditure limits conflict with First Amendment guarantees);
United States v. United Foods, 533 U.S. 405, 410-17 (2001) (holding that mushroom advertisement assessment requirement violated First Amendment); Good
News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 107-11 (2001) (holding school's
exclusion of club which uses Christianity to teach moral value was impermissible
viewpoint discrimination); Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 528-35 (2001) (holding that First Amendment protection of publishing rights outweighed claims
against privacy rights); Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 540-45 (2001)
(holding that funding restriction prohibiting Legal Services Corporation from distributing funds to organizations who represent clients in effort to amend or challenge existing welfare law is impermissible viewpoint discrimination).
189. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) ("The question in every
case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a

nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.").
190. United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 215 (2d Cir. 1950), affd, 341 U.S.
494 (1951) (discussing balancing test appropriate to determine statute's
constitutionality).
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law under review is "content-based" or "content neutral." 191 If the law
under review is content-based, 192 then the standard of review depends
upon the value of the category of speech that is being suppressed; high
value speech is protected by strict scrutiny review, 19 3 while laws affecting
mid- to low-value speech are judged by lower standards of review, such as
intermediate scrutiny1 94 or rational basis. 195 If the law is content neutral,
then the standard of review depends upon whether speech is being suppressed in a public forum or a nonpublic forum; content neutral laws limiting speech in a public forum are judged by a form of intermediate
scrutiny, 196 while laws regulating nonpublic fora are reviewed under a
19 7
form of the rational basis test.
But recent cases have not followed the standard doctrines. For example, in Bartnicki v. Vopper,19 8 a radio station had repeatedly played a tape of
a cellular telephone conversation that had been illegally recorded.' 9 9 The
participants in the conversation sued the radio station under the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, which prohibits the interception of
electronic communications and imposes civil and criminal liability on anyone who discloses such a conversation knowingly.2 00 Justice Stevens
191. As Daniel Farber explains:
The content distinction is the modern Supreme Court's closest approach
to articulating a unified First Amendment doctrine. Government regulations linked to the content of speech receive severe judicial scrutiny. In
contrast, when government is regulating speech, but the regulation is unrelated to content, the level of scrutiny is lower.
DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 21 (Foundation Press 1998).

192. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 197-98 (1992) (noting that law is
content-based if intent of lawmaker was to suppress idea or content of expression;
conversely, law is content neutral if intent of lawmaker was to restrict time, place or
manner of expression).
193. See id. at 197 n.3 ("[A] content-based regulation of political speech in a
public forum is valid only if it can survive strict scrutiny.").
194. See Fla. Barv. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623 (1995) ("[W]e engage
in "intermediate" scrutiny of restrictions on commercial speech ... ").
195. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57-61 (1973) (stating that
Georgia legislature could reasonably determine connection between antisocial behavior and obscene material). The Supreme Court implicitly applied the lenient
rational basis test to evaluate the constitutionality of a law regulating obscene
speech: "[T]here are legitimate state interests at stake in stemming the tide of
commercialized obscenity .... The Hill-Link Minority Report of the Commission
on Obscenity and Pornography indicates that there is at least an arguable correlation between obscene material and crime." Id. at 57-58.
196. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994)
("[R]egulations that are unrelated to the content of speech are subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny .... ).
197. See Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679 (1992)
(noting that regulation of speech on public property that is not traditional or designated public forum "need only be reasonable").
198. 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
199. See id. at 518-19.
200. See id. at 515 (summarizing Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act).
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traced the difficulty of the case to the fact that "[t]he Framers of the First
Amendment surely did not foresee the advances in science that produced
the conversation, the interception or the conflict that gave rise to this ac20 2
tion." 20 1 Justice Stevens determined that the law was content neutral,
which would normally require that the law merely satisfy the "intermediate
scrutiny" test.20 3 However, Justice Stevens did not apply intermediate
scrutiny. Instead, the Court simply balanced the competing interests that
it found to be at stake:
[T]hese cases present a conflict between interests of the highest
order-on the one hand, the interest in the full and free dissemination of information concerning public issues and, on the other
hand, the interest in individual privacy and, more specifically, in
fostering private speech.... [H]aving considered the interests at
stake, we are firmly convinced that the disclosures made by re20 4
spondents in this suit are protected by the First Amendment.
The dissenting Justices took the majority to task for failing to apply inter2 °5
mediate scrutiny to what was admittedly a content neutral law.
Similarly, in Federal Election Commission v. Colorado Republican Federal

Campaign Committee,20 6 the Court applied an ad hoc balancing test to determine the constitutionality of spending limits contained in the Federal
Election Campaign Act.20 7 The Court held that the appropriate standard
to evaluate the constitutionality of a spending limit imposed on a political
party's coordinated spending is whether the law is "closely drawn" to serve
"sufficiently important" governmental interests. 2°18 The dissent insisted
that this type of campaign finance law was a content-based restriction on
20 9
political speech and, as such, should be subjected to strict scrutiny.
Another challenge to existing First Amendment doctrine lies in the
difficulty that the Court has in drawing the line between content-based
201. Id. at 518 (acknowledging difficulty arising from interests of privacy and
of free dissemination of public information).
202. See id. at 526 (defining content neutral laws).
203. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 1999), aff'd, Bartnicki
v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (holding that law is content neutral and requires
intermediate scrutiny).
204. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 518, 529-35 (balancing relevant competing
interests).
205. See id. at 544-49 (criticizing majority's failure to apply intermediate
scrutiny).
206. 533 U.S. 431 (2001).
207. See id. at 456 (noting appropriate scrutiny standard).
208. Id. (citing Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 38788 (2000)) (stating that standard of scrutiny is same as applied to other political
actors).
209. See id. at 465-66 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that campaign financing law failed strict scrutiny).
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and content neutral laws. 2 10 This difficulty is exemplified by the Court's
decision this term in City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc.21 1 In Alameda,
the Court considered the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance that,
in effect, limited multi-use adult business establishments by requiring each
separate type of adult business (i.e. arcades, bookstores, massage parlors,
etc.) to be located 1000 feet from each other.2 12 While the plurality of the
Court found this law to be content neutral,2 13 Justice Kennedy, in his con2 14
currence, found the plurality's designation of the law to be "imprecise,"
but nevertheless applied "intermediate scrutiny" in determining its
2 15
constitutionality.
In summary, the Supreme Court has moved from applying doctrine to
a balancing approach in resolving First Amendment cases. This represents
a progression from formalism, to analogy, to realism. This progression is
demonstrated in the various judicial opinions from a single First Amendment case: Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v.
216

F. C. C.

B.

The Stages of Legal Reasoning: The Denver Area Case

The recent tendency of the Court to blur the distinction between content-based and content neutral laws and to utilize ad hoc balancing tests in
place of standard formulas in First Amendment cases is traced to the 1996
decision of the Court in Denver Area.2 17 In Denver Area, the United States
Supreme Court reexamined First Amendment principles as applied to the
210. The line between content-based and content neutral laws is not always an
easy one to draw. Compare United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)
(holding federal law that prohibits knowingly destroying or mutilating draft card is
content neutral), with United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 310 (1990) (holding
federal law that prohibits knowingly mutilating, defacing, physically defiling, burning, maintaining on floor or ground or trampling upon American flag is contentbased).
211. 122 S. Ct. 1728 (2002).
212. See City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 122 S. Ct. 1728, 1731-33
(discussing facts of case).
213. Id. at 1737 (relying on Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41 (1986),
which found that similar ordinance was content neutral).
214. Id. at 1739 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (disagreeing with holding in Renton
v. Playtime Theaters, 475 U.S. 41 (1986)).
215. Id. at 1741 (KennedyJ., concurring) (stating that zoning restriction designed to decrease secondary effects and not speech is subject to intermediate
scrutiny).
216. 518 U.S. 727 (1996).
217. See generally Diana Israelashvili, A Fearof Commitment: The Supreme Court's
Refusal to Pronounce a First Amendment Standardfor Cable Television in Denver Area
Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 71 ST. JOHN'S L. REv.
173 (1997) (describing how Court in Denver Area was reluctant to announce First
Amendment standard and decided specific claims only instead); Charles Nesson &
David Marglin, The Day the Internet Met the FirstAmendment: Time and the Communications Decency Act, 10 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 113, 118-19 (1996) (exploring type of balancing used). In addition to demonstrating how legal reasoning progresses from
formalism, to analogy, to realism, Denver Area also illustrates the clash between reli-
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medium of cable television. By vastly increasing the flow of information
into our homes, cable television has generated a number of issues centered on access to the cable platform. 218 Additionally, cable television
presents the Court with novel problems of interpretation because it has
"the unique communications role of being both a First Amendment
'speaker' and a conduit for the speech of others." 2 19 While the
opinions
of the lower court and the Supreme Court offer examples of all three
stages of legal reasoning, the novel aspects of the cable television communications medium made formalistic analysis impossible and strained analogistic reasoning to the breaking point. The plurality of the Court decided
the case utilizing a flexible, balancing approach. What makes the case
particularly instructive is that, in separate opinions, justices of the United
States Supreme Court vigorously debated the relative merits of reasoning
by analogy and realist analysis in order to resolve the issues before the
22 0
Court.
The Denver Area case concerned the constitutionality of three provisions of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act
of 1992 (the Cable Act or Act). 22 1 By means of this Act, Congress sought
to regulate and limit the dissemination of indecent programming 22 2 via
cable television. The provision of law provoking the sharpest division
among the justices was Section 10(a) of the Act,2 23 which authorized cable
ance on two different sources of law-precedent and policy. See HUHN, supra note
60, at 171-75 (discussing facts and analysis of Denver Area).
218. See Norman M. Sinel et al., Recent Developments in Cable Law, in 642 PLI/
Pat 9 (2001) (providing overview of developments in cable law).
219. Jonathon H. Beemer, Denver Area Telecommunications Consortium,
Inc. v. FCC and the Public Forum Status of Cable Access Channels, 63 BROOK. L. REV.
955, 955 (1997) (discussing problems associated with cable television and law).
Another commentator suggests that it is the convergence of television and Internet
technologies that is upsetting the existing legal paradigms: "When lurid and
graphic Internet sites can be accessed from a television remote control, cries for
new "decency" legislation may be impossible to ignore." Stephen M. Astor, Merging
Lanes on the Information Superhighway: Why the Convergence of Television and the Internet
May Revive Decency Standards, 29 Sw. U. L. REv. 327, 328 (2000) (discussing interpretation problems confronted in cable television cases).
220. Compare Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 732-68 (utilizing realistic balancing approach), with Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 812-38 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment
in part, dissenting in part) (rejecting balancing of interests and advocating analysis
by analogy). Jonathan Beemer observed: "Perhaps the most salient aspect of the
Court's decision in Denver Area is the disparity of judicial approaches used to analyze a First Amendment question within the context of a relatively new communications medium." Beemer, supra note 219, at 965.
221. See Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 732-33 (analyzing constitutionality of Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992); see also Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-305
§§ 10(a)-(c), 106 Stat. 1486 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 532 (h), (j) and
note following § 531 (1994)).
222. "Indecent programming" was defined in Section 10(a) of the Act as programming that the "operator reasonably believes describes or depicts sexual or
excretory activities or organs in a patently offensive manner." 47 U.S.C. § 532(h).
223. See id. (providing codification of section 10(a) of Cable Act).
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television operators to refuse to carry indecent programming on leased
224
access channels.
1.

The FormalistApproach of the Court of Appeals

The lower court, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, issued an en banc decision 225 upholding the constitutionality of Section 10(a) of the Act. The Court of Appeals concluded that
this case was governed by existing law. Specifically, the Court found that
there was no "state action" present in this case. 226 The Court of Appeals
held that cable television operators, as private actors, were not subject to
First Amendment constraints, and that the law in question, Section 10(a),
merely authorized them to do what they were in any event entitled to do
under the Constitution-that is, to exercise editorial control over the programming disseminated over their privately owned cable system. 227 In
short, the Court of Appeals found this to be an easy case, squarely governed by existing state action doctrine.
2.

The Supreme Court's Rejection of the Formalist Approach

Six justices of the Supreme Court authored opinions regarding the
constitutionality of Section 10(a), but no single opinion received five
votes, and no single line of reasoning commanded the support of a major2 28
ity of the court.
224. Since 1984, federal law has required cable operators to reserve ten to
fifteen percent of their channels for lease to unaffiliated producers. See 47 U.S.C.
§ 532(b) (requiring specific proportion of channels to be reserved for commercial
use by persons unaffiliated with cable operator). These reserved channels are the
"leased access" channels. Id.
225. See Alliance for Cmty. Media v. FCC, 56 F.3d 105, 110 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(upholding constitutionality of Section 10(a)). For a critique of the Circuit
Court's opinion, see James N. Horwood, Public, Educational,and GovernmentalAccess
on Cable Television: A Model to Assure Reasonable Access to the Information Superhighway
for All People in Fulfillment of the First Amendment Guarantee of Free Speech, 25 SETON
HALL L. REv. 1413, 1434-36 (1995) (arguing for immunity for programmers).
226. Alliance, 56 F.3d at 123 ("Because we find no state action here and because that essential element cannot be supplied by treating access channels as public forums, we do not reach petitioner's First Amendment attack on sections 10(a)
and 10(c).").
227. See id. at 114-15 ("The First Amendment ... certainly did not compel
prohibiting cable operators from exercising any editorial control over access programming."). The Court of Appeals relied principally upon Blum v. Yaretsky, 457
U.S. 991 (1982), in which the Supreme Court held: "Mere approval of or acquiescence in the initiatives of a private party is not sufficient tojustify holding the State
responsible for those initiatives." Alliance, 56 F.3d at 118 (quoting Blum, 457 U.S.
at 1004-05).
228. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S.
727, 727 (1996) (affirming in part and reversing in part lower court decision). In
upholding the constitutionality of Section 10(a) of the Cable Act, Justice Breyer,
writing for the plurality, wasjoined by Justices Souter, Stevens and O'Connor, each
of whom wrote a separate concurring opinion. Justice Thomas, joined byJustices
Scalia and Rehnquist, concurred in the judgment. Justice Kennedy, joined byJus-
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The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision upholding the constitutionality of Section 10(a) of the Act, but on grounds different from those relied upon by the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court
found "state action" to be present in the enactment of Section 10(a),
229
which altered the legal relations of private parties.
Justice Thomas, who wrote the concurring opinion, and Justice Kennedy, who dissented, agreed that the Denver Area case was governed by
established First Amendment doctrine, and reasoned by analogy to previously decided cases. They disagreed, however, as to which previous cases
were analogous to the case at hand, and this led them to different conclusions regarding the constitutionality of Section 10(a) of the Act.2 311 Justice
Breyer, who wrote the plurality opinion, rejected both the formalism of
the circuit court and the analogistic approach ofJustices Thomas and Kennedy, and instead crafted an opinion dominated by the third method of
23 1
legal reasoning: a realistic balancing approach.
3.

The Analogistic Approaches ofJustice Thomas and Justice Kennedy

As noted above, cable television is unlike other communications media in one important respect: it is both a speaker and a conduit for the
speech of others. 23 2 This dual role made it difficult for the Supreme
Court to draw a clear analogy between cable television and other media.
In reasoning by analogy, Justice Thomas and Justice Kennedy each perceived only one aspect of television's dual role. Justice Thomas characterized cable operators as "speakers," while Justice Kennedy conceived of
cable operators as "conduits."
tice Ginsburg, dissented. See id. at 727-31 (documenting opinions given by respective authors).
229. Id. at 737 ("Although the court [of appeals] said that it found no 'state
action,' it could not have meant that phrase literally, for, of course, petitioners
attack ('as abridg[ing] . . . speech') a congressional statute - which, by definition,
is an Act of 'Congress.'") (alteration in original) (citations omitted). Justice Kennedy added: "The plurality at least recognizes this as state action, avoiding the
mistake made by the Court of Appeals." Id. at 782 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
230. Compare id. at 733-53 (utilizing realistic balancing approach to find Section 10(a) constitutional), with id. at 812-38 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment
in part, dissenting in part) (analogizing cable operators to publishers, rather than
broadcasters, therefore stating that they are entitled to full First Amendment protection and finally agreeing that Section 10(a) was constitutional). But see id. at
780-812 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, dissenting in part) (analogizing common carriers to public forums, therefore applying
strict scrutiny and finding Section 10(a) unconstitutional). For a further discussion of the different analogies used by Justices Thomas and Kennedy, see infra
notes 232-52 and accompanying text.
231. See id. at 732-68 (utilizing realistic balancing approach in plurality
opinion).
232. For a further discussion of cable television as a form of communication,
see supra notes 183-216 and accompanying text.
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Justice Thomas, in his concurrence, voted to uphold Section 10(a) of
the Act on the ground that cable operators have the First Amendment
right to exercise editorial control over the programming they carry, and
that this statute did nothing more than reaffirm that right. He first observed that the Court, in Red Lion BroadcastingCo. v. EC.C.,2 33 had distinguished the broadcast media from the print media in respect of freedom
of expression in light of the scarcity of broadcast frequencies, and declared the First Amendment rights of broadcasters to be more limited
than the rights of publishers. 23 4 In the opinion of Justice Thomas, the
principal issue was whether cable television was more analogous to the
print media or to the broadcast media. Reasoning by analogy, Justice
Thomas concluded that cable operators were entitled to the full First
Amendment protection of publishers, rather than the more limited First
23 5
Amendment protection due to broadcasters.
Justice Thomas drew three analogies between cable operators and the
print media; specifically, he equated a cable television operator with the
owner of a bookstore, the editor of a collection of essays and a newspaper
publisher. Justice Thomas stated:
Drawing an analogy to the print media, for example, the author
of a book is protected in writing the book, but has no fight to
have the book sold in a particular bookstore without the store
owner's consent. Nor can government force the editor of a collection of essays to print other essays on the same subject....
233. 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding FCC order requiring radio station to
allow for response time to person whose character had been attacked during
broadcast).
234. See id. at 388 ("Where there are substantially more individuals who want
to broadcast than there are frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish."); see also Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic
Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 117-18 (1973) ("A broadcast licensee has a large measure of journalistic freedom but not as large as that exercised by a newspaper.").
235. See Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 814 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment in
part, dissenting in part) ("Over time, however, we have drawn closer to recognizing that cable operators should enjoy the same First Amendment rights as the
nonbroadcast media."). In support of his conclusion that Red Lion was inapplicable to cable operators, Justice Thomas cited TurnerBroadcastingSystem, Inc. v. FCC,
512 U.S. 622 (1994) [hereinafter TurnerI]. In particular, concerning constitutionality of "must carry" provisions of federal law:
In Turner, by adopting much of the print paradigm, and by rejecting Red
Lion, we adopted with it a considerable body of precedent that governs
the respective First Amendment rights of competing speakers. In Red
Lion, we had legitimized consideration of the public interest and emphasized the rights of viewers, at least in the abstract. Under that view, "[i]t is
the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters,
which is paramount." 395 U.S. at 390. After Turner, however, that view
can no longer be given any credence in the cable context. It is the operator's right that is preeminent.
Id. at 816 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part, dissenting in part)
(alteration in original) (citations omitted).
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Like a freelance writer seeking a paper in which to publish newspaper editorials, a programmer is protected in searching for an
outlet for cable programming, but has no freestanding First
236
Amendment right to have that programming transmitted.
Justice Thomas observed that the First Amendment rights of the
bookstore owner, editor and newspaper publisher all predominate over
the rights of authors and the rights of the reading public. 237 To compel a
publisher, editor or bookstore owner to publish or sell unsolicited works
would be "forced speech," and a serious infringement of First Amendment
freedoms. 23 8 Justice Thomas concluded that to compel a cable operator
to carry indecent programming against its will is likewise forced speech
23 9
and a violation of First Amendment rights.
Extending the analogy comparing cable television to the print media,
Justice Thomas expressly found the Court's decision in Miami HeraldPublishing Co. v. Tornillo240 controlling. In Tornillo, the Court invalidated a

state law that required newspapers to give persons a "right of reply" to
editorial attacks. 24 1 Justice Thomas reasoned that in light of Tornillo the
only rights of any constitutional significance in this case were the rights of
the cable operators, stating: "If Tornillo... [is] applicable, and I think [it
is] ....
then, when there is a conflict, a programmer's asserted right to
transmit over an operator's cable system must give way to the operator's
editorial discretion." 242 In the context of this case, he concluded that the
interests of programmers and viewers may not even qualify for First
Amendment consideration:
236. Id. at 816-17 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment in part, dissenting in
part) (balancing rights of programmers with rights of viewers).
237. See id. (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment in part, dissenting in part)
(commenting on predomination of rights of bookstore owners, editors and newspaper publishers over original authors).
238. Justice Thomas stated: "In no other public forum that we have recognized does a private entity, owner or not, have the obligation not only to permit
another to speak, but to actually help produce and then transmit the message on
that person's behalf." Id. at 829.
239. See id. at 820 ("There is no getting around the fact that leased and public
access are a type of forced speech."). Anticipating the issue that was later decided
in Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) [hereinafter Turner I/],
Justice Thomas took the position that "the proper question is whether the leased
and public access requirements ... are improper restrictions on the operators'free
speech rights." Id. at 822. In Turner If, the court rejected Justice Thomas's position, and upheld the constitutionality of the "must carry" provisions of federal law.
Turner II, 520 U.S. at 213-25.
240. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
241. See id. at 258 ("Even if a newspaper would face no additional costs to
comply with a compulsory access law and would not be forced to forgo publication
of news or opinion by the inclusion of a reply, the Florida statute fails to clear the
barriers of the First Amendment because of its intrusion into the function of
editors.").
242. DenverArea, 518 U.S. at 816 (Thomas,J., concurring in judgment in part,
dissenting in part) (acknowledging importance of transmitter discretion).
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None of the petitioners in these cases are cable operators; they
are all cable viewers or access programmers or their representative organizations ....

It is not intuitively obvious that the First

Amendment protects the interests petitioners assert, and neither
petitioners nor the plurality have adequately explained the
243
source or justification of those asserted rights.

Like Justice Thomas, Justice Kennedy reasoned by analogy to existing
First Amendment law. In contrast to Justice Thomas, however-who had
found that cable operators were analogous to bookstore owners, editors or
newspaper publishers-Justice Kennedy found that cable television operators were analogous to telephone companies: "Laws requiring cable operators to provide leased access are the practical equivalent of making them
common carriers, analogous in this respect to telephone companies: They
are obliged to provide a conduit for the speech of others." 244 Accordingly, the correct analogy was to the Court's decision in Sable Communications v. FC.C.,2 4 5 where the Court had struck down a federal law
prohibiting "indecent" commercial telephone messages because such a
law "has the invalid effect of limiting the content of adult telephone conversations to that which is suitable for children to hear." 246 Next, Justice
Kennedy analogized common carriers to public forums: "A common carriage mandate, nonetheless, serves the same function as a public forum. It
ensures open, nondiscriminatory access to the means of communication." 247 Accordingly, Justice Kennedy concluded that strict scrutiny
should apply: "The functional equivalence of designating a public forum
and mandating common carriage suggests the same scrutiny should be
applied to attempts in either setting to impose content discrimination by
law. Under our precedents, the scrutiny is strict."248 Applying strict scrutiny, Justice Kennedy found that Section 10(a) of the Act was unconstitutional because it was not "narrowly tailored" to protect children from
indecent programming. Justice Kennedy noted that, under the law, cable
operators could choose to transmit indecent programming, in which case
children could see it, or cable operators could choose not to transmit it, in
which case adults as well as children would be prevented from seeing it. 249
243. Id. at 817 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment in part, dissenting in
part).

244. Id. at 796 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part, dissenting in
part). For an extended analysis arguing that cable television should be treated as a
public forum, see generally Beemer, supra note 219.
245. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
246. Id. at 131 (stating that law limits adult conversation).
247. Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 797-98 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in
part, dissenting in part).
248. Id. at 798 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part, dissenting in

part) (advocating open access of communication).
249. See id. at 806-07 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part, dissenting

in part) (noting that restriction limits not only child access but adult access as
well).
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Like Justice Thomas, Justice Kennedy decided that under relevant
case law only some of the parties had First Amendment rights that were at
stake. Unlike Justice Thomas, however, Justice Kennedy found that the
rights of the cable operators had been "extinguished:"
For purposes of these cases, we should treat the cable operator's
rights in these channels as extinguished, and address the issue
these petitioners present: namely, whether the Government can
discriminate on the basis of content in affording protection to
certain programmers. I cannot agree with Justice Thomas that
250
the cable operator's rights inform this analysis.
According to Justice Kennedy, the relevant interests, for constitutional purposes, were the rights of the programmers and the viewing public, and government is not free to "exclude speech it dislikes by delimiting
public fora."2 5 1 Justice Kennedy noted, "[m]inds are not changed in
streets and parks as they once were. To an increasing degree, the more
significant interchanges of ideas and shaping of public consciousness oc25 2
cur in mass and electronic media."
4.

The Realist Approach of Justice Breyer

Arguing by analogy, Justice Thomas treated cable operators as speakers, and Justice Kennedy treated them as conduits for other speakers. In
contrast, by refusing to adopt any specific analogy, Justice Breyer was able
to treat cable operators both as speakers and as conduits.
Instead of identifying a single analogous case and applying the rule of
that case to the case at hand, Justice Breyer sought to identify all of the
relevant values and interests that were at stake. Justice Thomas had found
that the Denver Area case was controlled by Tornillo, in which the editorial
discretion of the newspaper publisher predominated. Justice Kennedy
had found common carrier cases such as Sable Communicationsto be controlling, and that, like telephone companies, the rights of cable operators
were not at stake; the only rights of any significance were the rights of
persons utilizing and viewing the cable platform.
Justice Breyer, in his plurality opinion, declined to follow the examples of Justice Thomas and Justice Kennedy in attempting to unravel the
knotty doctrinal questions raised by the case. A series of related public
forum questions that Justice Thomas or Justice Kennedy addressed, but
that Justice Breyer did not, included: (1) whether cable operators are
"common carriers;" (2) whether public access and leased access channels
on cable are a "public forum;" (3) whether private property may ever be
250. Id. at 796 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part, dissenting in

part) (citations omitted).
251. Id. at 802 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part, dissenting in
part) (discussing interest in not limiting speech).
252. Id. at 802-03 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part, dissenting in
part) (commenting on reach of public forum).
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considered a public forum; and (4) whether content discrimination in a
public forum should be treated as a limitation on the forum. 253 Justice
Breyer not only declined to address the public forum issues in this case, he
did not answer basic threshold issues such as whether Section 10(a) of the
Act is a content-based or a content neutral law, and whether indecent
speech is fully protected or only marginally protected under the First
2 54
Amendment.
Justice Breyer bypassed the threshold issues and proceeded directly to
a realist analysis. His explanation for this mode of review was that the
threshold issues had nothing to do with the ultimate constitutionality of
the law. He characterized the threshold categories (content-based or content neutral law, high value or low value speech, public forum or nonpublic forum) as mere "labels," that do not change the underlying realities of
2 55
the law or the speech being suppressed.
By leapfrogging the threshold issues, Justice Breyer also avoided using
established standards of review such as strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny and rational basis. 25 6 Justice Breyer's reasoning is a nearly pure exam253. Justice Breyer expressly acknowledged his decision not to resolve these
public forum issues. He explained: "Rather than decide these issues, we can decide this case more narrowly, by closely scrutinizing § 10(a) to assure that it properly addresses an extremely important problem, without imposing, in light of the
relevant interests, an unnecessarily great restriction on speech." Id. at 743.
254. Breyer observed: "Nor need we here determine whether, or the extent to
which, Pacifica does, or does not, impose some lesser standard of review where
indecent speech is at issue." Id. at 755 (Breyer, J., plurality). In FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation,Justice Stevens, writing for the plurality, found that indecent speech
received lesser First Amendment protection. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S.
726, 745-48 (commenting that "government must remain neutral in the marketplace of ideas"). While Justice Powell, concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment, thought that indecent speech was fully protected speech. See id. 438
U.S. at 761-62 (Powell, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment) (pointing
to individual to decide decency).
255. Breyer noted:
But unless a label alone were to make a critical First Amendment difference (and we think here it does not), the features of these cases that we
have already discussed-the Government's interest in protecting children, the "permissive" aspect of the statute, and the nature of the medium-sufficiently justify the "limitation" on the availability of this forum.
Id. at 750.
256. "In adjudicating Sec. 10(a) .... the plurality elected not to use traditional First Amendment standards." Elizabeth Nau Smith, Note, Children'sExposure
to Indecent Materialof Cable: Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, an Interpretation of the Cable Television Consumer Protection Act of
1992, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 1041, 1078 (1998) (describing plurality's reluctance to
use traditional First Amendment analysis). Strict scrutiny requires proof that the
law is "necessary" to accomplish a "compelling governmental interest." Intermediate scrutiny requires proof that the law is "substantially related" to achieving an
"important governmental purpose." The standard employed by Justice Breyer in
Denver Area studiously avoids adopting either formula: "[W]e can decide this
case ... by closely scrutinizing Section 10(a) to assure that it properly addresses an
extremely important problem, without imposing, in light of the relevant interests,
an unnecessarily great restriction on speech." Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 743.
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pie of "legal realism," characterized by the balancing of interests and the
absence of doctrine. Justice Breyer did not apologize for this absence of
doctrine; instead, he maintained that the interests of the parties and the
reasonableness of the law were unaffected by the legal category that might
2 57
apply.
Justice Breyer's realist approach enabled him to consider the interests
of all of the interested parties, making his analysis more comprehensive
than the analogistic approaches of Justice Thomas and Justice Kennedy.
Unlike Justice Thomas, who considered only the rights of the cable operators, and unlike Justice Kennedy, who gave weight only to the rights of
programmers and the viewing public, Justice Breyer considered and bal258
anced the rights of all of the parties.
5.

The Difference Between Formalist and Realist Analogies:Justice Breyer's
Realist Analogy to the Pacifica Case

Justice Breyer rejected the traditional categorical analysis of First
Amendment jurisprudence, but he did not altogether abandon reasoning
259
by analogy. He identified and followed a case he thought analogous,
F. C. C. v. PacificaFoundation.260 In Pacifica, the Court considered the con-

stitutionality of a federal law prohibiting the broadcasting of "obscene, indecent, or profane language," as applied to a daytime radio broadcast of
George Carlin's "Filthy Words" monologue. 26' The Pacifica Court held

257. Justice Breyer stated: "Finally, and most important, the effects of Congress' [sic] decision on the interests of programmers, viewers, cable operators, and

children are the same, whether we characterize Congress' [sic] decision as one
that limits access to a public forum, discriminates in common carriage, or constrains speech because of its content." Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 750.
258. Justice Breyer wrote: "While we cannot agree with Justice Thomas that
everything turns on the rights of the cable owner, we also cannot agree with Justice
Kennedy that we must ignore the expressive interests of cable operators alto-

gether." Id. at 747. Jerome Barron approves of Breyer's comprehensive approach:
"[T]he new balancing analysis highlights the entire gamut of interests in play."
Jerome A. Barron, The Electronic Media and the Flightfrom FirstAmendment Doctrine:
Justice Breyer's New BalancingApproach, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFoRM 817, 817 (1998).
259. Justice Breyer stated: "Rather than seeking an analogy to a category of
cases, however, we have looked to the cases themselves. And, as we have said, we
found that Pacifica provides the closest analogy and lends considerable support to
our conclusion." Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 747-48.
260. 438 U.S. 726 (1978). Scholars anticipated that Pacifica would apply to
cable television. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Majorie L. Esterow, CensoringIndecent Cable Programs: The New Morality Meets the New Media, 51 FORDHAm L. REv. 606,
613-20 (1983) (analyzing future of cable television within First Amendment jurisprudence); Lynn D. Wardle, Cable Comes of Age: A ConstitutionalAnalysis of the Regulation of "Indecent" Cable Television Programming,63 DENy. U. L. REv. 621, 646-47
(1986) (discussing effects of Pacifica on cable television and radio broadcasting).
261. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 742 (noting issue before Court).
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that, considering the nature of the speech, 262 the time of day, 2 63 the intrusiveness of the medium of radio 264 and its accessibility to children,2 65 that
the law was constitutional as applied.2 6 6 Justice Breyer noted that the nature of the speech that was banned by Section 10(a) of the Cable Act, as
well as the pervasiveness of cable television and its accessibility to children,
2 67
was similar to Pacifica and that the cases were therefore analogous.
Despite finding the facts in Pacifica analogous to the facts in Denver
Area, and despite his decision to reach the same result, Justice Breyer did
not apply the reasoning of the Pacifica decision. He did not find Section
10(a) to be content-based, as the plurality did in Pacifica.268 He also did
not ascribe a lower value to offensive speech, as the plurality did in
Pacifica.2 69 In short, Justice Breyer did not mechanistically apply the reasoning of Pacifica to the facts. Instead, he drew the analogy in order to
identify the interests and values that the Court would take into account in
weighing the validity of the law in question. In so doing, Justice Breyer
made a realist analogy, not a formalist analogy.
As noted above, reasoning by analogy may be either formalist or realist. 2 7 0 A formalistic analogy compares the factual elements of an existing
case to the facts of a new case and, if the facts are sufficiently similar, then
the rule of the first case is applied to the new case. But practically all cases
can be distinguished in some respect from a case already decided. 27' For
example, Denver Area involved the regulation of indecent speech on cable
television, while Pacifica concerned the regulation of indecent speech on
262. See id. at 744-48 (recognizing obscene nature of speech as well as its limited social value).
263. See id. at 750 (noting that broadcast of indecent language during daytime
was less protected than same broadcast at night).
264. See id. at 748-49 (discussing pervasive presence of broadcast media in
lives of Americans).
265. See id. at 749-50 (discussing how radio's immediate nature and unregulated access reaches more children than other types of media).
266. See id. at 750-51 (upholding constitutionality of law based on specific
facts present).
267. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S.
727, 744 (1996) (noting that factors relied upon in Pacica existed in cable
television).
268. See Pacfica, 438 U.S. at 744 ("[T]he content and the context of speech
are critical elements of First Amendment analysis .... ).
269. See id. at 746 (noting that "[offensive] utterances are no essential part of
any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that
any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality") (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 572 (1942)).
270. For a further discussion of formalism and realism, see supra notes 23-38,
58-67 and accompanying text. See also HUHN, supra note 60, at 120-25 (providing
examples of each).
271. See Brewer, supra note 45, at 932 (noting that "everything is similar to
everything else in an infinite number of ways, and everything is also dissimilarto
everything else in an infinite number of ways.").
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radio. Is this difference important? A natural response to that question is,
"Important compared to what?" When drawing an analogy, how do we
measure the importance of a factual similarity or distinction?
Steven Burton refers to this as "the problem of importance," 272 and it
cannot be resolved simply by comparing the facts of one case to the facts
of another case. Without knowing the values or interests that are served
by a rule of law, there is no basis for deciding whether or not an existing
rule of law rule ought to be extended to a new case.
A critical step in the reasoning process is to determine what values
and interests are at stake. How is this accomplished? One could attempt
to simply imagine what the various values and interests are, and arbitrarily
assign them weight, but this effort is likely to fail. Richard Warner has
described the difficulty of using a mere "thought experiment" to identify
all of the relevant interests and values at stake, and instead recommends:
"Looking retrospectively over a long series of cases reveals differences and
distinctions that mere imagination is likely to miss." 2 73 Although purely

formalist analogies that compare the facts of one case to the facts of another case are of limited utility, reasoning by analogy is a critical step in
constructing a realist argument because, by examining cases with similar
facts, we may identify the relevant values and interests that are implicated
in the case under consideration.
In Denver Area, for example, all of the analogies contributed to the
eventual realist analysis of the case. Justice Thomas's analogy to the law of
print media highlighted the First Amendment value of protecting the editorial discretion of the owners of media. Justice Kennedy's analogy to the
public forum cases identified the value of maximizing public access to the
means of communication, in view of the fact that the principal means of
public communication no longer takes place in the streets and parks, but
through telecommunications and mass media. Justice Breyer's analogy to
Pacifica implicated the value of shielding children from a pervasive and
intrusive source of offensive speech. Realistic reasoning, therefore, uses
analogies to identify all of the values and interests implicated by a case so
that a court may weigh them and make an informed choice. Justice Breyer
used all of the competing analogies for this purpose, and in balancing the
interests of cable operators, programmers and viewers, concluded that giving cable operators editorial control over indecent speech on leased channels was constitutional.

272.

STEVEN

J.

BURTON, AN INTRODUcTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING 83-

84 (1985) (identifying problem of importance as determining which facts should
lead courts to decide one way or another).
273. Warner, supra note 13, at 1560 (acknowledging that imagination alone
will not reveal relevant differences).
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The Justices' Dispute over Realism and Reasoning by Analogy

Justice Kennedy opened his dissenting opinion with the words, "[t] he
plurality opinion, insofar as it upholds Section 10(a) of the 1992 Cable
Act, is adrift."27 4 He deplored the indeterminacy of Justice Breyer's reasoning, decrying its lack of predictability, particularly in light of the fact
that the result was nonprotective of speech. 275 He believed "the most disturbing aspect of the plurality opinion" was "its evasion of any clear legal
standard in deciding this case." 27 6 He characterized the reasoning as "a
legalistic cover for an ad hoc balancing of interests" that would "sow confusion in the courts. ' 277 While admitting that the advance of technology
creates difficult cases, he argued that this does not justify ignoring established precedent and well-settled doctrine: "The novelty and complexity of
the case is a reason to look for help from other areas of our First Amend274. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727,
780 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment and dissenting in part) (criticizing lack of specificity within holding).
275. See id. at 787 ("The novelty and complexity of these cases is a reason to
look for help from other areas of our First Amendment jurisprudence, not a license to wander into uncharted areas of law with no compass other than our opinions about good policy."). One pair of scholars has suggested that even Justice
Cardozo would not have approved of Justice Breyer's "pure" realistic approach:
Justice Kennedy is correct. The approach followed by the plurality would
have been shocking to Justice Cardozo because the plurality is saying that
history is unclear, the method of analogy is too confusing, we are uncertain about applicable customs, and social values give uncertain guidance.
Therefore, rather than pursuing these analyses, we'll just balance the interests and hope we did the right thing.
Jonathan Wallace & Michael Green, Bridging the Analogy Gap: The Internet, the Printing Press and Freedom of Speech, 20 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 711, 731-32 (1997) (arguing
that adherence to standards, even when protecting unpopular speech, is central
achievement of First Amendment jurisprudence).
Several student commentators have also agreed with Justice Kennedy on this
point. SeeJeffrey D. Kaiser, Comment, The Future of Cable Regulation Under the First
Amendment: The Supreme Court's Treatment of Section 10(a) of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 5 UCLA ENT. L. REv. 103, 139 (1997)
("The Status of the First Amendment regarding cable television now seems more
unpredictable and vague . . .and leaves open several undesirable possibilities.");
James L. Simmons, Note, The ContinuingStruggle to Find a Placefor Cable Television in
the Pantheon of First Amendment Precedent: Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC, 34 Hous. L. REv. 1607, 1635 (1998) ("The approach
espoused by Justice Breyer sets a dangerous precedent in the realm of First
Amendment jurisprudence."); see also Mara Andre Glaser, Casenote, Cable Television's New Standard Is No Standard: An Analysis of the Supreme Court's Balancing Act in
Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC, 30 CREIGHTON
L. REv. 1461 (1997) (concluding that Supreme Court should have declared standard of scrutiny for cable television); Jarrod V. Henshaw, Note, Denver Area Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC: Reconciling TraditionalFirst Amendment
Media Jurisprudence with Emerging Communications Technologies, 41 ST. Louis U. L.J.
1015, 1017 (1997) ("Denver represents ...an aberration from precedent .... ).
276. Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 784 (Kennedy,J., concurring in part, concurring
in judgment in part, dissenting in part) (critiquing plurality opinion).
277. Id. at 786 (criticizing plurality's restatement of legal tests and standards).
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ment jurisprudence, not a license to wander into uncharted areas of the
2 78
law with no compass other than our own opinions about good policy."
Finally, Justice Kennedy asserted a vigorous defense of reasoning by analogy, noting that "[t]his newfound aversion to analogical reasoning strikes
' 279
at a process basic to legal analysis.
Justice Breyer countered by noting the inapplicability of the analogies
cited by Justices Kennedy and Thomas:
Both categorical approaches suffer from the same flaws: They import law developed in very different contexts into a new and
changing environment, and they lack the flexibility necessary to
allow government to respond to very serious practical problems
without sacrificing the free exchange of ideas the First Amend2 80
ment is designed to protect.
Justice Breyer traced his rejection of established standards and analogies to the fast pace of technological change:
But no definitive choice among competing analogies (broadcast,
common carrier, bookstore) allows us to declare a rigid single
standard, good for now and for all future media and purposes.
That is not to say that we reject all the more specific formulations
of the standard-they appropriately cover the vast majority of
cases involving government regulation of speech. Rather, aware
as we are of the changes taking place in the law, the technology,
and the industrial structure related to telecommunications, we
believe it unwise and unnecessary definitively to pick one analogy
28 1
or one specific set of words now.
Justice Breyer's balancing approach received explicit support from
the concurring justices. Justice Stevens said, "[1] ike Justice Souter, I am
convinced that it would be unwise to take a categorical approach to the
resolution of novel First Amendment questions arising in an industry as
dynamic as this."28 2 Justice O'Connor added, "I agree with Justice Breyer
that we should not yet undertake fully to adapt our First Amendment doc278. Id. at 787 (commenting on plurality's approach to media).
279. Id. at 799-800 (relying on EDwARD LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REFASONING 1-2 (1949)).

280. Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 740. Justice Thomas, who concurred in the judgment with Justice Breyer, nevertheless joined Justice Kennedy's criticism of
Breyer's analysis: "It is true that the standard I endorse lacks the 'flexibility' inherent in the plurality's balancing approach, but that relative rigidity is required by
our precedents and is not of my own making." Id. at 818 (Thomas, J., concurring
in judgment in part, dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
281. Id. at 741-42 (examining history of First Amendment jurisprudence and
its impact on current issue).
282. Id. at 768 (Stevens, J., concurring) (adding opinion advocating less categorical approach to industry).
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283
Justice Souter echoed this
trine to the new context we confront here."
theme, noting: "All of the relevant characteristics of cable are presently in
'2 8 4
Furthermore, he observed
a state of technological and regulatory flux."
that "as broadcast, cable, and the cybertechnology of the Internet and the
World Wide Web approach the day of using a common receiver, we can
hardly assume that standards for judging the regulation of one of them
will not have immense, but now unknown and unknowable, effects on the
others." 285 Justice Souter was, in effect, unwilling to cast First Amendment
doctrine in stone at a time when society was beginning to communicate in
cyberspace. 286 Justice Souter's closing remark contained this caution:
"Maybe the judicial obligation to shoulder these responsibilities can itself
be captured by a much older rule, familiar to every doctor of medicine:
'First, do no harm.'"287

The Denver Area case is instructive not only because the justices of the
United States Supreme Court utilized both analogy and realism in reaching their decisions, but because they debated the relative merits of each
mode of reasoning. The justices implicitly agreed that the case could not
be resolved with the certainty of formalism. Justice Kennedy and Justice
Thomas argued that the Court ought to embrace the consistency and predictability of reasoning by analogy, while Justice Breyer and the concurring justices employed a realistic approach in order to avoid the
straightjacket of analogy in this rapidly changing technological setting.
In the following section of this Article, I discuss a series of cases in
which the courts moved from formalism to analogy in determining a legal
283. Id. at 779-80 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (supporting more conservative application of First Amendment).
284. Id. at 776 (Souter, J., concurring) (advocating slower resolution of issues
due to volatile nature of industry).
285. Id. at 776-77 (Souter, J., concurring) (commenting on outreaching effects of decisions associated with media at issue). One year later, the Supreme
Court struck down provisions of the Communications Decency Act which attempted to limit children's access to "indecent" or "patently offensive" speech over
the Internet. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997) (holding that CDA provisions abridged First Amendment protected "freedom of speech"); see generally
Steven R. Salbu, Who Should Govern the Internet: Monitoring and Supporting a New
Frontier, 11 HAv. J.L. & TECH. 429 (1998) (recommending targeted federal preemption of Internet activities); Kim L. Rappaport, Note and Comment, In the Wake
of Reno v. ACLU: The Continued Struggle in Western ConstitutionalDemocracies with
Internet Censorship and Freedom of Speech Online, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 765 (1998)
(analyzing difficulty posed by Reno for Internet regulation).
286. Justice Souter quoted and agreed with Professor Lessig that "if we had to
decide today... just what the First Amendment should mean in cyberspace ....we
would get it fundamentally wrong." Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 777 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Lawrence Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 YALE L.J. 1743, 1745
(1995)).
287. Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 778 (Souter, J., concurring); see Cass R. Sunstein,
Constitutional Caution, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 361, 362-63 (1996) (agreeing with
Justice Souter's careful approach). But see Israelashvili, supra note 217, at 195 (stating that Court's failure in Denver Area to declare First Amendment standard for
cable television has injured First Amendment principles).
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question that some legal scholars have urged is now ripe for realistic
analysis.
C.

Family Law and the New Reproductive Technology

Biomedical advances have made possible new ways of procreating a
child and have led to the creation of a new being-human embryos
outside the womb. 28 8 These technological advances have, in turn, given
rise to new legal questions regarding the determination of parentage and
the nature of parental or ownership rights over potential human life.
1.

Parentage in GestationalSurrogacy Cases

Technological breakthroughs in biology and medicine have made gestational surrogacy possible, 289 and have also created a novel question of
law: Who is the legal mother of the child? Three gestational surrogacy
cases posing this issue have reached the courts: Johnson v. Calvert,290 decided by the California Supreme Court, Belsito v. Clark,29 1 decided by an
Ohio Probate Court and In Re Marriageof Buzzanca,29 2 decided by the Cali288. In vitro technology has not only made possible a new way to procreate, it
has also opened the window to human genetic engineering and stem cell research,
raising a host of bioethical and legal questions. See generally LoRi B. ANDREWS ET
AL., GENETICS: ETHIcs, LAW AND POLICY (2002) (providing comprehensive study of
ethical and legal aspects of genetic research).
289. See Malina Coleman, Gestation, Intent, and the Seed: Defining Motherhood in
the Era of Assisted Human Reproduction, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 497, 498 n.6 (1996)
(listing several procedures available to solve infertility); see also Pamela LauferUkeles, Approaching Surrogate Motherhood: ReconsideringDifference, 26 VT. L. REv. 407,
409 (2002) (commenting on various methods employed in battle against infertility); Richard F. Storrow, Parenthood by Pure Intention: Assisted Reproduction and the
Functional Approach to Parentage, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 597-98 (2002) (discussing
assisted reproduction); Kimberly R. Willoughby & Alisa A. Campbell, Having My
Baby: Surrogacy in Colorado, COLO. LAW., Jan. 31, 2002, at 103 (describing law of
gestational surrogacy).
290. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993). See generally Todd M. Krim, Beyond Baby M.:
InternationalPerspectives on GestationalSurrogacy and the Demise of the Unitary Biological
Mother, 5 ANNALS HEALTH L. 193 (1996) (reviewing Johnson case in context of various approaches in determining who is legal mother); Anne Reichman Schiff, Solomonic Decisions in Egg Donation: Unscrambling the Conundrum of Legal Maternity, 80
IOWA L. REV. 265 (1995) (advocating decision of who is legal mother based upon
parties' intentions); Robert M. Kort, Casenote, Johnson v. Calvert, California Supreme Court Enforces Surrogacy Contract, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 243 (1994) (providing critical analysis of Johnson case).
291. 644 N.E.2d 760 (Ct. Com. P1. Ohio 1994). See generally Victoria L. Fergus,
Note, An Interpretation of Ohio Law on Maternal Status in Gestational Surrogacy Disputes: Belsito v. Clark, 21 DAYTON L. REV. 229 (1995) (advocating legislative action
to settle future disputes); Michelle Pierce-Gealy, Comment, "Are You My Mother?":
Ohio's Crazy-Making Baby-Making Produces a New Definition of "Mother",28 AKRON L.
REV. 535 (1995) (analyzing impact of Belsito); Stephanie F. Schultz, Comment, Surrogacy Arrangements: Who Are the "Parents"of a Child Born Through Artificial Reproductive Techniques?, 22 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 273 (1995) (reviewing different approaches
courts have adopted to determine legal parent).
292. 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
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fornia Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit. The cases arose amid different facts, but presented the same legal question of maternity.
In Johnson, Mark and Crispina Calvert desired to have a child, but
Crispina, though fertile, was unable to carry a pregnancy. The Calverts
entered into a surrogacy agreement with Anna Johnson, pursuant to
which an embryo created from the Calvert's gametes would be implanted
into Anna's womb; Anna agreed to bear their child and relinquish the
child to the Calverts at birth. When the child was born, however, Anna
29 3
changed her mind and sought to retain custody of him.

In Belsito, the procreative facts were identical to those of the Johnson
case. Shelly Belsito could produce viable ova, but was unable to gestate a
child. Her sister, Carol Clark, agreed to bear the pregnancy on behalf of
Shelly and her husband Anthony. Unlike Anna Johnson, Carol was at all
times faithful to the surrogacy arrangement. In Belsito, the parties were
suing for a declaration that upon the birth of the child Shelly and
Anthony would be considered the lawful parents, making an adoption pro294
cedure unnecessary.
The Buzzanca case presented an even more baffling question of parentage. Luanne and John Buzzanca had agreed to create their child by
having a donated embryo, genetically unrelated to either of them, implanted into a gestational surrogate.2 9 5 John filed for divorce one month
before the child (Jaycee) was born. In the divorce case, he claimed that he
and Luanne were notJaycee's legal parents, while Luanne contended that
they were the legal parents. 2 96 The surrogate who bore Jaycee delivered
her to Luanne and made no claim of parentage. 29 7 In Buzzanca, unlike
Johnson and Belsito, neither of the intended parents were genetically related to the child. Also unlike Johnson and Belsito, neither the birth mother
nor the genetic mother made any claim to the child. In determining maternity, the practical choice before the court in Buzzanca was between the
intended mother and no mother.
a.

The Formalist Argument

Only one of the courts in the gestational surrogacy cases embraced a
purely formalist approach to resolving the question of parentage, and that
court handed down a remarkable decision. The trial court in Buzzanca
found this to be a clear case under existing law; it reached the unprece293. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 777-92 (discussing facts of case).
294. See Belsito, 644 N.E.2d at 760-62 (contending couple are genetic and natural parents and are entitled to legal status of parenthood); Pierce-Gealy, supra
note 291, at 551-52 (asking to be recognized as natural parents to avoid adopting
child genetically their own).
295. See Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 282 (discussing facts of case).
296. See id. (filing petition alleged that no existence of children during marriage while response stated parties were expecting child by way of surrogate
contract).
297. See id. (appearing in court, birth mother made no claim to child).
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dented conclusion that Jaycee was born without legal parents. 29 8 Ruling
on Luanne's claim to be the lawful mother, the court said: "One, there's
no genetic tie between Luanne and the child. Two, she is not the gestational mother. Three, she has not adopted the child. That, folks, to me,
respectfully, is clear and convincing evidence that she's not the legal
29
mother." 0
The trial court formalistically applied the rules of law setting forth the
legal criteria for motherhood (genetics, gestation or adoption), and found
that Luanne failed to qualify as the legal mother under any of those
rules. 300 The court determined that the child had no mother or father in
the eyes of the law. Despite the fact that all of the people who created the
child were alive, in the opinion of the trial court, the child was born an
30 1
orphan.
The appellate court in Buzzanca overruled the trial court's decision.3 0 2 The California Court of Appeal rejected the formalist approach
of the trial court, choosing instead to reason from analogy and by reference to public policy. 30 3 Analogical reasoning and policy analysis also
dominated the opinions of the courts in Johnson and Belsito.
b.

Analogical Reasoning

Prior to the gestational surrogacy cases of Johnson, Belsito and Buzzanca, the leading surrogacy case was In Re Baby M.10 4 As in Johnson, the
surrogate in Baby M. changed her mind upon giving birth to the child and
sought to retain custody. 305 A key difference between the gestational surrogacy cases and Baby M., however, was that the birthmother of Baby M.,
Mary Beth Whitehead, was also the genetic mother, the child having been
conceived through artificial insemination. The New Jersey Supreme
30 6
Court considered Mary Beth Whitehead to be the child's legal mother.
The Johnson and Belsito courts declined to apply the rule of Baby M. on the
ground that the traditional rule conferring maternity on the birthmother
30 7
had never been intended to apply to cases of gestational surrogacy.
298. See id. at 289 (noting legal paradigm adopted by trial court).
299. Id. at 283 (quoting trial judge).
300. See id. (citing trial court's analysis).
301. See id. at 289 (noting trial court holding that, absent adoption, children
of artificial reproduction with no biological relationship with intended parents will
be dependents of state).
302. See id. at 293-94 (reversing trial court judgment).
303. See id. at 289 (according public policy in favor of establishing legal
parenthood).
304. 537 A.2d 1227 (NJ. 1988).
305. See id. at 1235-37 (discussing facts of case).
306. See id. at 1263 (finding that Mrs. Whitehead "is not only the natural
mother, but also the legal mother" of Baby M.).
307. SeeJohnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 789 (Cal. 1993) (distinguishing surrogacy arrangement in Baby M. from "gestational" surrogacy in present case); Bel-
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Having distinguished Baby M., the courts were without a clearly applicable rule to guide them, thus they proceeded to reason from analogy.
The courts were faced with no shortage of analogies from which to draw a
rule of decision.3 08 The problem was that for each analogy drawn in favor
of finding parentage in a particular party, a contradictory analogy was
found. The parties argued and the courts discussed a welter of analogies
thought to govern the question of parentage in cases of gestational surrogacy. Competing analogies were drawn from the fields of contract law,
family law and the law of gender equality. 30 9 In addition, the Buzzanca
court relied upon a fourth analogy, comparing gestational surrogacy to
the practice of artificial insemination.
2.

Contract Law: Contractfor the Sale of Goods or Contractfor the Sale of
Services

In Johnson, both sides argued that the gestational surrogacy agreement between Anna Johnson and the Calverts was a contract, but they
disagreed about whether it was more like a contract for the sale of goods
or more like a contract for services. Counsel for AnnaJohnson contended
that the agreement was a contract for the sale of goods-Anna's babyand, therefore, that the contract amounted to "babyselling," which is prohibited by statute. 310 The California Supreme Court in Johnson rejected
the "babyselling" analogy, 3 11 finding that a surrogacy contract is more like
a lawful agreement for the rendering of gestation services, 3 12 and awarded
the child to the Calverts on the ground that this was the result consistent
3 13
with the intent of the parties to the contract.
3.

Family Law: Adoption or FosterParenthood

The Ohio Probate Court in Belsito rejected both of the foregoing analogies to the law of contract, and also rejected the "intent of the parties"
test employed by the California Supreme Court in Johnson.3 14 Instead, the
sito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760, 763-64 (Ct. Com. Pl. Ohio 1994) (declining to extend
traditional rule).
308. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782 (relying on parties' intentions and public
policy issues).

309. See id. at 791-93 (noting contractual issues regarding relationships between parents and children, as well as dehumanization argument).
310. Id. at 783-84; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 273 (West 1999) (making pay-

ment for adoption misdemeanor).
311. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 785 ("We are ...unpersuaded by the claim that

surrogacy will foster the attitude that children are mere commodities; no evidence
is offered to support it.").
312. See id. at 784 ("The payments to Anna under the contract were meant to
compensate her for her services in gestating the fetus and undergoing labor,
rather than for giving up 'parental' rights to the child.").
313. See id. at 782 (discussing intent of contracting parties).
314. See Belsito v.Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760, 764-66 (Ct. Com. P1. Ohio 1994)
(rejecting Johnson test).
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Ohio court noted that abundant precedent existed for a traditional standard for determining parentage: namely, genetic relationship. The court
held that maternity is to be determined by genetic relationship, unless the
genetic parent waives parental rights (as in the case of a sperm or egg
donor), 3 15 and the court entered judgment for the genetic mother. In
support of this conclusion, the Belsito court initially noted that a gestational surrogacy arrangement bears resemblance to a private adoption
agreement that would normally require a postpartum waiver of maternal
rights by the mother. 3 16 Accordingly, because the genetic mother had not
waived her maternal rights, the Ohio court ruled that she was the legal
3 17
mother of the child at birth.
The Johnson court had rejected the adoption analogy, reasoning that
gestational surrogacy is comparable to adoption only if one assumes the
very point in controversy, viz. that either the genetic mother or the gestational mother is the lawful mother whose parental rights predominate unless waived.3 18 The California trial court in Johnson offered a competing
analogy. Instead of finding gestational surrogacy comparable to a private
adoption, it likened gestational surrogacy to foster parenthood.3 19 The
court reasoned that the surrogate merely has custody of another person's
3 20
child for a time that the true parents are unable to care for it.
4.

Gender Equality: Paternalismor Involuntary Servitude

Anna Johnson's attorneys drew a third analogy on behalf of their client. It was argued that gestational surrogacy is a form of slavery or involuntary servitude, exploitative of women and, therefore, against public
policy.32 1 The California Supreme Court responded to the surrogate's argument by adopting a competing analogy. The court found Johnson's
315. See id. at 766 ("The consent to procreation and the surrender of the right
to raise a child of one's own genes must be considered the surrender of basic
rights.").
316. See id. at 767 (discussing waiver of parental rights in adoption process).
317. See id. (ruling genetic mother had not waived her rights to be natural
and legal parent of child).
318. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 784 (discussing difference between gestational
surrogacy and adoption). One scholar has proposed that a gestational surrogate,
like a mother who has promised to give up her child for adoption, should have the
power to keep the child if this right is exercised within five days after the birth of
the child. See Amy Garrity, Comment, A ComparativeAnalysis of Surrogacy Law in the
United States and Great Britain-A Proposed Model Statute for Louisiana, 60 LA. L. REX'.
809, 830 (2000) (extolling rights of mothers to have sufficient time after birth in
which to make decisions).
319. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 786 n.13 (analogizing Anna's relationship with
child to that of foster mother).
320. See Alice Hofheimer, Gestational Surrogacy: Unsettling State Parentage Law
and Surrogacy Policy, 19 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 571, 580 (1993) (discussing
holding in Johnson); Catherine Gewertz, Genetic Parents Given Sole Custody of Child
Surrogate, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1990, at A-1 (discussing Johnson case).
321. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 784 (discussing involuntary servitude argument
involved in gestational surrogacy); see also George J. Annas, Using Genes to Define
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proposed restrictions on gestational surrogacy analogous to paternalistic
laws that prohibited women from entering professions or earning a
3 22
livelihood.
5.

The Analogy Between Gestational Surrogacy and Artificial Insemination

In Buzzanca, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's decision of
Jaycee's "legal orphanage," and found that Luanne and John were Jaycee's
legal mother and father.32 3 In crafting its opinion, the court reasoned
principally from analogy 324 and, like the Ohio Probate Court in Belsito,
drew an analogy to an existing rule of family law to reach a decision.3 25 In
assessingJohn Buzzanca's claim that neither he nor Luanne were Jaycee's
lawful parents, the court analogized gestational surrogacy to the practice
of artificial insemination. 326 The court noted that a husband who consents to his wife's artificial insemination is the legal father of the resulting
child under the case law 32 7 and statutory law328 of the State of California,
even though he is not the genetic father. In drawing the analogy between
artificial insemination and the facts of Buzzanca, the Court of Appeal
noted specifically the husband's consent to the procedure and his role in
causingthe creation of the child militated in favor of finding him to be the
329
legal father of the child.
Motherhood-The California Solution, 326 NEW ENG.J. MED. 417, 419 (1992) (discussing use of terms that objectify and dehumanize gestational mothers).
322. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 785 (discussing analogy of restrictions on gestational surrogacy to paternalistic laws and equality of women); see generally Lori B.
Andrews, Surrogacy Wars, Slavery or Blessing? After Six Years of Emotional Battle, Paid
Motherhood is Still Controversial, CAL. LAW., Oct. 12, 1992, at 43 (commenting on
debates surrounding surrogacy decisions).
323. See In Re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 293-94 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1998) (declaring Luanne lawful mother and John lawful father of Jaycee).
324. See id. (using analogies in reasoning). The court also cited precedent,
noting that in Johnson the California Supreme Court had anticipated the fact situation in Buzzanca and proposed a solution by way of obiter dictum:
In what we must hope will be the extremely rare situation in which
neither the gestator nor the woman who provided the ovum for fertilization is willing to assume custody of the child after birth, a rule recognizing the intending parents as the child's legal, natural parents should best
promote certainty and stability for the child.
Id. at 210 (quoting Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 783 (Cal. 1993)).
325. See id. at 292 (engaging in act which merely opened possibility of procreation results in responsibility for consequences).
326. See id. at 284-88 (analogizing gestational surrogacy to practice of certified
insemination).
327. People v. Sorensen, 437 P.2d 495, 499-500 (Cal. 1968) (holding that husband who consents to wife's artificial insemination is legal father of child).
328. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613 (West 1994) ("If, under the supervision of a
licensed physician and surgeon and with the consent of her husband, a wife is
inseminated artificially with semen donated by a man not her husband, the husband is treated in law as if he were the natural father of a child thereby
conceived.").
329. The court stated:
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In a traditional surrogacy case, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts declined to apply the artificial insemination statute because the
result would have made the husband of the surrogate, who had consented
to the procedure, the legal father of the child-a result that was not intended by the legislature.
a.

33 0

The Realist Argument

Ultimately, the gestational surrogacy cases drew analogies that were
strained at best. The decision in Johnson applying the law of contract to
surrogacy agreements suffers from the flaw that many aspects of surrogacy
contracts are unenforceable. For example, several jurisdictions have limited payment to surrogates. 331 Additionally, the surrogate's constitutional
right to bodily integrity would trump the contractual rights of the intended parents. Prior to viability, the surrogate probably has an absolute
right to choose an abortion rather than fulfill the agreement.3 32 It is even
doubtful that the intended parents could specifically enforce provisions of
the surrogacy agreement imposing restrictions on the surrogate's behavior
such as forbidding the use of tobacco or alcohol. 3 3 3 Accordingly, it is
anomalous to apply the law of contract to determine parentage.
The analogical reasoning of the Belsito court-resulting in the application of the genetic relationship test to cases of gestational surrogacywhile adequate to decide the case before the court, would not have sufficed in Buzzanca, where neither the birthmother nor the genetic mother
sought legal parentage. Similarly, the analogy drawn in Buzzanca between
John argues that the artificial insemination statute should not be applied
because, after all, his wife did not give birth. But for purposes of the
statute with its core idea of estoppel, the fact that Luanne did not give
birth is irrelevant. The statute contemplates the establishment of lawful
fatherhood in a situation where an intended father has no biological relationship to a child who is procreated as a result of the father's (as well as
the mother's) consent to a medical procedure.
Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 288.
330. See R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790, 795-96 (Mass. 1998) (doubting legislature intended MASS. GEN. LAW § 4B to apply to child of married surrogate
mother); see also Storrow, supra note 289, at 608-09 (refusing to apply artificial
insemination statute).
331. See Daniel Rosman, Surrogacy: An Illinois Policy Conceived, 31 Lo. U. CHI.
L.J. 227, 233-34 (2000) (describing Illinois statute authorizing gestational surrogacy, and noting that Illinois, like most states, limits payment to surrogates).
332. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (reaffirming
Roe holding recognizing woman's right to choose abortion before fetal viability);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 141 (1973) (holding, before end of first trimester,
woman has right to choose abortion free from state interference). But see Kevin
Yamamoto & Shelby A.D. Moore, A Trust Analysis of a GestationalCarrier'sRight to an
Abortion, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 93, 174-79 (2001) (arguing that gestational surrogate
could be forced to carry child to term unless her life or health is in danger).
333. See Abby Brandel, Legislating Surrogacy: A PartialAnswer to Feminist Criticism, 54 MD. L. REV. 488, 519 (1995) (advocating use of home studies rather than
coercive contract clauses on alcohol or drug use).
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gestational surrogacy and artificial insemination also seems inapposite. A
sperm donor is a close equivalent to an egg donor,3 3 4 but is not similarly
situated to a gestational surrogate who carries and gives birth to a child.
The analogical reasoning in Johnson, Belsito and Buzzanca has the same
strengths and weaknesses as the analogical opinions of Justice Kennedy
and Justice Thomas in the Denver Area case. Kennedy and Thomas each
invoked existing rules of law by analogy to govern a new case-the regulation of indecency on cable television. Their approaches had the advantages of familiarity and predictability, but suffered from the inability to
take into account the relevant interests of all of the affected parties. Similarly, although the Johnson, Belsito and Buzzanca courts identified a number
of relevant analogies from contract law, family law and the law of women's
rights, ultimately no single analogy offers a persuasive rationale.
In Johnson and Belsito, the courts expressly noted that they had resolved a novel question of maternity by invoking an existing rule of law by
analogy. 3 35 In the opinion of Professor Malina Coleman, both the rationale in Johnson (contract law) and the rationale in Belsito (genetic relationship) undervalue the contribution of the gestational mother, and are
inadequate to protect her legitimate interests.3 36 The Johnson and Belsito
courts, although acknowledging the novelty of the issues presented, at334. See, e.g., McDonald v. McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477, 481 (N.Y. App. Div.
1994) (holding that child conceived with donated egg implanted into woman with
husband's consent was lawful child of marriage). In McDonald, the similarity of a
sperm donor and an egg donor was the decisive factor. See id. at 480.
335. SeeJohnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 781 (Cal. 1993) (resolving dispute
before court by interpreting use of term "natural mother" within meaning of Civil
Code § 7003, subd. (1)); Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760, 766 (Ct. Com. P1. Ohio
1994) (believing more prudence in traveling known path with existing law as guide
to legal pattern in order to fashion new law). Both courts disclaimed that they
were developing new law, and instead indicated that it was the province of the
legislature to make such changes. The California court stated, "It is not the role of
the judiciary to inhibit the use of reproductive technology when the Legislature
has not seen fit to do so .... " Johnson, 851 P.2d at 787. The Ohio Probate Court
echoed this sentiment:
If a break with traditional law and public policy, as represented by the
Johnson test, is to be made part of the law of this state, it must be argued
that the legislature, through the scrutiny of public hearings and debate, is
better situated than a judicial proceeding to test the effectiveness and
appropriateness of such a change.
Belsito, 644 N.E.2d at 766.
336. See Coleman, supra note 289, at 510-14, 517-18 (explaining how gestational contribution was undervalued in Johnson); see also Lori B. Andrews & Nanette
Elster, Regulating Reproductive Technologies, 21 J. LEGAL MED. 35, 49 (2000) (citing
lack of uniformity for laws concerning surrogates); John A. Robertson, Assisted Reproductive Technology and the Family, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 911, 925-27 (1996) (proposing
number of protections for gestational surrogates). One scholar has argued that
the gestational surrogate "cannot be fully marginalized as a womb for rent and
must be afforded some rights as a woman with 'motherly' claims." Laufer-Ukeles,
supra note 289, at 445. Amy Garrity's proposed surrogacy statute contains a number of protections for gestational surrogates, including the right to custody of the
child. See Garrity, supra note 318, at 822-32.
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tempted to resolve these cases by resorting to familiar rules of law. Profespublic policies
sor Coleman argues for a more nuanced balancing of 3the
37
court.
either
by
adopted
was
than
interests
private
and
In the course of their opinions, the gestational surrogacy courts identified a number of interests and policies that influenced their determinations of parentage including the procreative rights of an infertile married
couple,338 the interest of the state in assigning parentage to all children,3 3 9 the likelihood that the intended parents are more likely to protect the child's interests than persons connected merely through genetics
or gestation,3 4 0 the policy of discouraging private agreements to give up
parental rights,3

41

the right of a person to be given an unpressured oppor-

tunity before a neutral magistrate to surrender parental rights, 42 the responsibility of the state to supervise the placement of a child, 343 the
promotion of stability and finality in placement decisions 344 and the right
345
of a genetic provider to consent to the use of his or her unique genes.
The analogies drawn by the parties and the courts were the vehicle by
which these interests and values were brought to the forefront. As in the
Denver Area case, the analogical arguments served to identify the policies
that inform a realist analysis. The task that still awaits the courts is to balance all of these interests and policies in formulating a new and comprehensive law of parentage in cases of gestational surrogacy.
In the following section of this Article, I discuss a case where the
court, like the plurality in Denver Area, rejected reasoning by analogy for a
realistic approach.

337. See Coleman, supra note 289, at 529 (advising legislatures and courts to
establish system of rules with recognition of legal parenthood based on parties'
intentions). Coleman "recommends that intent should be the determinative factor, but only if a system of rules is in place to protect against overreaching in surrogacy agreements. Otherwise, motherhood should be based on gestation alone."
Id. at 499.
338. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 786-87 (explaining right to create family through
medical procedures).
339. See In Re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 289-90 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1998) (citing compelling state interest in establishing parentage).
340. See id. at 290 (choosing to bring child into being is more likely to result
in having child's best interest at heart).
341. See Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760, 765 (Ct. Com. P1. Ohio 1994) (citing
that, as matter of public policy, states will not enforce or encourage private agreements to give up parental rights).
342. See id. (stating adoption laws of Ohio require that natural mother have
opportunity to be heard before magistrate before relinquishing rights).
343. See id. (noting state's interest in protecting child).
344. See id. (noting public policy in providing stability to adopted child).
345. See id. at 766 (stating that "replication . . . should occur only with the
consent of that individual").
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The Legal Status of the Human Embryo

In vitro fertilization, the same medical technology that makes gestational surrogacy possible, has also brought into existence a new form of
being: a human embryo which can, in frozen state, survive outside the
womb. The novel legal question created by this technology is, in the event
of a dispute, what are the rights of various parties with respect to this form
of life?

3 46

In Davis v. Davis,34 7 the Tennessee Supreme Court confronted the
question of defining the legal status of human embryos. Junior and Mary
Sue Davis had begun treatment at a Knoxville fertility clinic. At the time
of their divorce, seven preembryos created from their gametes were in
frozen storage at the clinic. Each spouse sought possession of the embryos; Mary Sue wanted to donate the embryos to an infertile couple for
348
implantation, and Junior wished to have them destroyed.
Two analogies from the law of domestic relations potentially applied
to this case. If the embryos were considered children, then the court
should award custody to the parent best able to care for them. If the embryos were property, then the court ought to divide the embryos among
the parties along with the other marital property.
The trial court followed the first analogy, and awarded the "children"
to their "mother" in accordance with the rule that custody is to be deter'3 4 9
mined by reference to "the best interests of the child.
The intermediate appellate court did not expressly identify the nature
of the parties' legal interests in the embryos, but, in the opinion of the
Tennessee Supreme Court, the lower appellate court had "left the implica3 50
tion that it is in the nature of a property interest."
The Tennessee Supreme Court rejected both analogies, finding that
human embryos were neither "persons" nor "property. '35 1 The court expressly adopted a realist approach to resolve this case: "[W]e must weigh
346. See generally Lori B. Andrews, The Legal Status of the Embryo, 32 Loy. L. REV.

357 (1986) (addressing legal status of embryo in medically-assisted reproduction);
John A. Robertson, In the Beginning: The Legal Status of Early Embryos, 76 VA. L. REv.
437 (1990) (addressing legal status of embryos).
347. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992) (deciding custody of frozen embryos); see
Developments in the Law-Medical Technology and the Law, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1519,
1542-46 (1990) (discussing implication of Davis); Jennifer Marigliano Dehmel,
Note & Comment, To Have or Not to Have: Whose ProcreativeRights Prevail in Disputes
Over Dispositionsof Frozen Embryos?, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1377, 1385-92 (1995) (summarizing Davis procedural history and holding); Alise R. Panitch, Note, The Davis Dilemma: How to Prevent Battles over Frozen Preembryos, 41 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 543, 55365 (1991) (analyzing arguments over legal status of frozen embryos).
348. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 589-90 (discussing dispute).
349. Id. at 594 (determining that entities were not preembryos but "children
in vitro").
350. Id. at 596 (noting lower court failure to precisely define "interest").
351. Id. at 597 ("We conclude that preembryos are not, strictly speaking, either 'persons' or 'property,' but occupy an interim category that entitles them to
special respect because of their potential for human life.").
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the interests of each party to the dispute, in terms of the facts and analysis
set out below, in order to resolve that dispute in a fair and responsible
manner." 352 In balancing the interests of the parties, the court decided in
favor of the husband, concluding that "Mary Sue Davis's interest in donation is not as significant as the interest Junior Davis has in avoiding
353
parenthood."
In summary, in hard cases; the reasoning- of the courts progresses
from formalism to analogy to realism. Realist analogies serve as the bridge
between formalism and realism by identifying all of the underlying values
and interests that must be taken into account. In the following portion of
this Article, I argue that it is this evolution of rules and standards that
reveals the stage structure of legal reasoning.
III.

THE STAGES OF LEGAL REASONING IN THE EVOLUTION OF RULES
AND STANDARDS

Law may take the form of rules or of standards. A law requiring drivers to stop at a red light is a rule. A law requiring drivers to proceed
cautiously through a blinking yellow light is a standard. To determine

guilt or innocence, the application of a rule depends solely on the existence of specific facts (i.e., did the car stop?).3 54 The application of a
standard involves the consideration of one or more facts in light of one or
more underlying values (i.e., how fast was the car going, what were the
weather, road and traffic conditions and how much danger will the law
tolerate?). 355 Larry Alexander offers the following distinctions between
rules and standards:
352. Id. at 591 (setting out analysis with regard to custody).
353. Id. at 604 (holding that husband's interest outweighed wife's). The

court noted:
Ordinarily, the party wishing to avoid procreation should prevail, assuming that the other party has a reasonable possibility of achieving
parenthood by means other than use of the preembryos in question. If
no other reasonable alternatives exist, then the argument in favor of using the preembryos to achieve pregnancy should be considered.
Id. at 604.
354. Several scholars have observed this fundamental distinction between
rules and standards. See generally David L. Faigman, Constitutional Adventures in
Wonderland: Exploring the DebateBetween Rules and Standards Through the Looking Glass
of the First Amendment, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 829, 834 (1993) ("Implicit in rules-based
application is a straightforward factual determination."); Russell B. Korobkin, BehavioralAnalysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REv. 23, 25
(2000) ("Rules establish legal boundaries based on the presence or absence of
well-specified triggering facts."); Kathleen M. Sullivan, TheJustices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARv. L. REv. 22, 58 (1992) ("Rules aim to confine the decisionmaker to
facts, leaving irreducibly arbitrary and subjective value choices to be worked out
elsewhere.").
355. See generally Sullivan, supra note 354, at 58 ("A legal directive is a 'standard'-like when it tends to collapse decisionmaking back into the direct application of the background principle or policy to a fact situation.").
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Rules are often described as "bright-line" (clear and easy to
follow), "formal" (to be applied without regard to substance of
the results but only with regard to the rule's terms) and "opaque"
(to the rules' background justifications).
Standards are norms that have the opposite characteristics.
A standard can be applied only by engaging in evaluation.
Therefore, to the extent that evaluation is contentious and uncertain, standards will be as well. Standards are thus vague, substantive (as opposed to formal), and transparent (to background
values) .356
One of the most significant choices between rules and standards in
American law occurred in the drafting of the exceptions to the hearsay
rules under the Federal Rules of Evidence. In 1969, the Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence proposed the following standard for determining admissibility as an exception to the rule against hearsay: "A
statement is not excluded by the hearsay rule if its nature and the special
357
circumstances under which it was made offer assurances of accuracy.
Ultimately, this basic approach to the law of hearsay was rejected, and the
Federal Rules incorporated a lengthy list of specific exceptions to the rule
against hearsay. 3 58 The only remnant of the Advisory Committee's original standard is the "residual exception" to the rule against hearsay, now
codified in Rule 807, which provides that a hearsay statement is admissible
if it has equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness and is
more probative of a material fact than other available evidence.3 59 Legis356. Alexander, supra note 52, at 541.
357. 46 F.R.D. 161, 345 (1969) (stating Proposed Rule 8-03(a) (1969 Preliminary Draft)); see also David E. Sonenshein, The Residual Exceptions to the FederalHearsay Rule: Two Exceptions in Search of a Rule, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 867, 871-72 (1982)
(citing Proposed Rule) ("In short, the 1969 draft contained no specific exceptions
to the hearsay rule; any hearsay that met the relatively unguided standard of Rules
8-03(a) and 8-04(a) could be admissible.").
358. See Sonenshein, supra note 357, at 872-75 (citing procedural history of
Rule); see alsoJoseph W. Rand, The Residual Exceptions to the FederalHearsay Rule: The
Futile and Misguided Attempt to RestrainJudicialDiscretion, 80 GEo. L.J. 873, 879-880
(1992) (citing procedure and adoption of present residual exceptions).
359. See FED. R. EVID. 807 (citing to Rule in present form). Rule 807 provides:
A statement not specifically covered by Rule 803 or 804 but having
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, is not excluded
by the hearsay rule, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative
on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the
proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general
purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by
admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not
be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes
known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing
to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it,
the proponent's intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it,
including the name and address of the declarant.
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lative history indicated that Congress intended for this exception to be
applied only in exceptional circumstances. 360 Legal scholars have disagreed on the question of whether or not courts have abused their discre361
tion in interpreting the residual exceptions.
In their derivation, rules and standards do not correspond with formalism and realism. Both rules and standards can be derived either formalistically or realistically. A court can create a rule of law by balancing
competing interests and values, 3 62 or it can consider itself bound to apply
a standard because the standard is set forth in definitive text or precedent.3 63 It is in the application of law that there is a correspondence between rules and formalism, and a correspondence between standards and
realism. Rules are usually applied formalistically (i.e., did the driver
stop?), and standards must be applied realistically (i.e., did the driver proceed cautiously?).364

The "rules versus standards" debate has engrossed jurisprudential
scholars. 3 65 Many authors have examined the relative merits of rules and

360. See Rand, supra note 358, at 880 (noting that overbroad exceptions
would weaken hearsay rule).
361. Compare Leonard Birdsong, The Residual Exception to the Hearsay RuleHas It Been Abused-A Survey Since the 1997 Amendment, 26 NOVA L. REv. 59, 108
(2001) (finding no abuse of discretion), withJames E. Beaver, The Residual Hearsay
Exception Reconsidered, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 787, 791 (1993) (finding that "the
catchall exceptions are being used more generally than in rare and exceptional
circumstances").
362. See, e.g., Faigman, supra note 354, at 839 (observing that "actual malice"
rule from New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), "was molded out of a
close examination of the balance of rights and interests inherent in the First
Amendment"); Peter Krug, Justice Thurgood Marshall and News Media Law: Rules
Over Standards?, 47 OKLA. L. REV. 13, 14 (1994) (describing number of rules that
Justice Marshall derived from standards).
363. See Wilson, supra note 30, at 786 (noting "a pragmatic functionalist can
be a doctrinal formalist").
364. The connection between rules and formalism, and standards and realism, was mentioned by William Eskridge. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Relationships
Between Formalism and Functionalism in Separation of Powers Cases, 22 HARV. J. L. &
PUB. POL'Y 21, 21-22 (1998):
Formalism might be associated with bright-line rules that seek to place
determinate, readily enforceable limits on public actors. Functionalism,
at least as an antipode, might be associated with standards of balancing
tests that seek to provide public actors with greater flexibility.
Id. at 21.
365. See, e.g., Faigman, supra note 354, at 830 (stating that "the amount of ink
spilled over debating the virtues of rules versus standards would lead the reasonable observer to believe that something momentous was at stake").
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standards, particularly from the standpoint of efficiency 3 66 and fairness. 367
Other scholars have explored whether the choice between rules and standards correlates with ideological perspective. 3 68 The point that I wish to
make in this Article is that the stages of legal reasoning play a role in the
evolution of rules and standards.
Rules and standards are not the only forms that laws can take. Instead, laws fall along a spectrum of generality. 369 The more specific a law
366. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE
L.J. 557, 557-68 (1992) (discussing relative costs of creating and applying rules and
standards). He concludes that economic efficiency turns on "the extent to which
the law should be given content before individuals act (rules), rather than waiting
until afterward (standards)." Id. at 621. But see David A. Weisbach, Formalism in the
Tax Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 860, 884 (1999) (arguing that anti-abuse standards
would be more efficient than rules at curbing tax avoidance); see alsoJason Scott
Johnston, BargainingUnder Rules Versus Standards, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 256, 258
(1995) (examining relative efficiency of two-party bargaining under rules and standards); Korobkin, supra note 354, at 30-35 (reviewing economic and behavioral
implications of rules versus standards). Economic efficiency is not, of course, the
only value that the law serves. CompareJ. Clark Kelso, A Report on the California
Appellate System, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 433, 450 (1994) (arguing that courts could improve their efficiency by developing "stable, certain, and predictable rules of law"),
withJoseph R. Grodin, Are Rules Really Better Than Standards?,45 HASTINGS L.J. 569,
570 (1994) (responding that 'judicial economy seems a questionable basis for formulating common-law legal doctrine").
367. Several scholars have argued that rules, as compared to standards, are
over- and under-inclusive. See Alexander, supra note 7, at 42 (stating that inclusiveness of rules does not compare to their background or moral reasoning); Isaac
Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL
STUD. 257, 268-70 (1974) (arguing that rules are arbitrary, as compared to standards). But see Bernard W. Bell, Dead Again: The Nondelegation Doctrine, The Rules/
StandardsDilemma and the Line Item Veto, 44 VILL. L. REv. 189, 200-01 (1999) (arguing that while rules may be under- and over-inclusive, "standards create the possibility that similar people will be treated differently"); Kaplow, supra note 366, at
589 (contending that specific standards may also miss their mark); see also generally
Faigman, supra note 354, at 838 (contending that in defining rights "the court
must weigh the social importance of the government action against the value of
individual liberty infringed by that action").
368. See Sullivan, supra note 354, at 96 (concluding that liberal and conservative justices used both rules and standards in their reasoning). "[R]ules and standards simply do not map in any strong or necessary way onto competing political
ideologies, or, in the setting of constitutional adjudication, onto the side of
rightholders or the state." Id. In a landmark article, Kathleen Sullivan examined
the use of rules and standards by justices of the United States Supreme Court during the 1991-1992 term. In that work, Sullivan sought to determine whether there
was a correlation between political affiliation and the judge's affinity for rules versus standards. Sullivan suggests, however, that "[i]deological poles tend to attract
rules," and that "[s]tandards moderate ideological swings between poles." Id. at
122.
369. See Korobkin, supra note 354, at 26 (stating that "the two types of legal
forms are better understood, as a descriptive matter, as endpoints of a spectrum
than as dichotomous categories"); accord Faigman, supra note 354, at 831 (asserting
that there is no categorical distinction between rules and standards); Kaplow, supra
note 366, at 561 (noting that "legal commands mix the two (rules and standards)"); Wilson, supra note 30, at 773 (describing variety of forms along this spec-
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is, the more "rule-like" it is, and the more general it is, the more "standardlike" it is.3 70 Over time, rules of law are often modified to become more

standard-like, and standards are frequently modified to become more
rule-like.
A number of scholars have traced this evolution from rules to standards, or from standards to rules, in different fields of the law. 37 1 Authors
have detected trends from rules to standards in commercial law3 72 and

civil procedure, 373 while movement from standards to rules has been observed in attorney ethics, 374 juvenile criminal law, 3 75 criminal sentencing,"1 76 federal income tax law 3 77 and corporate law. 3 78 In some areas of

the law, the pendulum has swung back and forth between rules and standards. For example, on the question of whether a cause of action is
barred by the lapse of time, the last century saw specific statutes of limitation replace the general doctrine of laches 379 but, more recently, courts
have attempted to mitigate the harshness of statutes of limitations by formulating tolling doctrines such as the "discovery" 38 0 and "adverse dominatrum, including exceptions to rules, multi-factor tests, totality of circumstances
tests, "escape hatches" and "peepholes").
370. See, e.g., Korobkin, supra note 354, at 28 (stating "[m]ulti-factor balancing tests are less pure and more rule-like than requirements of 'reasonableness'
because they specify ex ante (to a greater or lesser degree of specificity) what facts
are relevant to the legal determination.").
371. See Sullivan, supra note 354, at 123 (concluding her review of Supreme
Court's 1991 term by observing that "the cycle of rules and standards will continue;
this Term's divisions were but a chapter").
372. See G.Richard Shell, SubstitutingEthicalStandardsfor Common Law Rules in
Commercial Cases: An Emerging Statutory Trend, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 1198, 1204 (1988)
(observing that many of these emerging standards were statutorily enacted).
373. See Kelly D. Hine, Comment, The Rule of Law is Dead, Long Live the Rule:
An Essay on Legal Rules, Equitable Standards, and the Debate OverJudicialDiscretion, 50
SMU L. REV. 1769, 1777 (1997) (reporting that reform led to open and flexible
system of court procedure).
374. See Mary C. Daly, The Dichotomy Between Standards and Rules: A New Way of
Understandingthe Differences in Perceptions of Lawyer Codes of Conduct by U.S. and Foreign Lawyers, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1117, 1124-42 (1999) (tracing transformation from standards to rules in United States).
375. See Lee E. Teitelbaum, Youth Crime and the Choice Between Rules and Standards, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REv. 351, 352 (citing movement in juvenile system to be more
like rules oriented criminal system).
376. See id. at 360 (examining emphasis on rule-based sentencing).
377. See James W. Colliton, Standards, Rules, and the Decline of the Courts in the
Law of Taxation, 99 DICK. L. REV. 265, 265 (1995) (citing progression of tax law
from system "governed by broad standardsto a law dominated by specific rules").
378. See Matthew G. Dore, Statutes of Limitation and CorporateFiduciary Claims:
A Searchfor Middle Ground on the Rules/Standards Continuum, 63 BROOK. L. REv. 695,
773-75 (1997) (recalling importance of bright line rules in development of corporate law).
379. See id. at 720-22 (setting forth that majority view "emerged that claims
against corporate directors and officers were more in the nature of claims for a
breach of an implied trust, to which statutes of limitation could apply").
380. Id. at 733-35 (explaining tolling until discovery in fraud cases).
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tion" theories. 3 1 In a counter-response to the uncertainty created by
these equitable doctrines, some legislatures have attempted to enact stat382
utes of repose.
Several scholars have examined how rules become standards, and
how standards become rules. Russell B. Korobkin has concisely described
this process: 'Just as a pure rule can become standard-like through unpredictable exceptions, a pure standard can become rule-like through the ju383
dicial reliance on precedent."
The defining characteristic of a rule is that it can be applied by making a simple factual determination. However, as Korobkin notes, rules become more standard-like through the creation of exceptions.3 8 4 As a rule
is interpreted in case after case, the courts often discover that, in light of
the underlying purpose of the rule, it ought not be applied strictly according to its terms. Thus, exceptions to the rule are created in certain factual
situations. The more exceptions that arise, the less determinative the rule
is. If an underlying policy is identified that explains the rule and all of its
various exceptions, the law may be more simply38

5

expressed in light of

this underlying policy, and the rule has evolved into a standard. 38 6 In
381. Id. at 709-15 (citing "three rationales most often advanced for tolling
limitations under the adverse domination theory"). These rationales include "(i) a
corporate entity is 'disabled' and cannot sue wrongdoing directors or officers
when they control it; (ii) during the period of their control, directors and officers
are in a position to conceal information about their own wrongdoing from those
who might try to bring suit on behalf of the corporation; and (iii) the corporation
should not be charged with 'notice' of claims against wrongdoing directors and
officers while they control the entity." Id. at 710-11.
382. See State ex. rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062,
1085-87 (1999) (striking down tort reform act on state constitutional grounds).
The Ohio legislature has repeatedly attempted to enact a statute of repose as part
of its efforts at tort reform. Id.
383. Korobkin, supra note 354, at 29 (illustrating how courts may modify standards to rules based on precedent). James Wilson agrees: "After several cases have
been litigated in a related area, litigants, scholars, and judges may be able to infer
a more rigid rule where only an impulse initially existed." Wilson, supra note 30, at
820.
384. See Korobkin, supra note 354, at 27 (stating that "at the extreme, when a
rule is enforced rarely or randomly, it can be said that the law's form has migrated
across the legal form spectrum and become a standard"); Book Note, The Bureaucrats of Rules and Standards, 106 -Ahv. L. REv. 1685, 1687-88 (1993) (reviewing IAN
Ax'mts AND JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONStvE REGULATION (1992)) (observing that exceptions to rules tend to create standards). "The ... suggestion that agencies
enforce only the 'spirit' of the laws, either by granting informal waivers or by approving compliance plans, amounts to a proposal for a broad shift from rules to
standards." Id.

385. I thank Elizabeth Reilly for the suggestion that at some point in the
evolution of a rule it becomes simpler to express the law in terms of a standard.
This is an application of "Occam's Razor" to principles of law.
386. See Korobkin, supra note 354, at 26-27 (illustrating how rule can evolve
into standard). Korobkin states:

The more qualifications and exceptions a rule has, however, the more
likely it will be applied unpredictably .... At the extreme, when a rule is
enforced rarely or randomly, it can be said that the law's form has mi-
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other words, the exceptions have swallowed the rule. The initial draft of
the Federal Rules of Evidence attempted to achieve this result by creating
a single standard that would replace all of the specific exceptions to the
38 7
rule against hearsay.
In a similar manner, standards become more rule-like as the courts
gain experience with them. The defining characteristic of a standard is
that its application requires a weighing of multiple policy considerations.
As a standard is construed, in case after case, eventually factual similarities
are discovered among the cases. If the factual patterns in these cases are
consistent, then it may be simpler to express the legal consequences of the
standard as contingent upon the presence of those factual patterns rather
than upon a weighing of the underlying policies, and the standard has
evolved into a rule. 388

In other words, the holdings have swallowed the

standard. In this manner, the interpretation of the residual exception to
the rule against hearsay may eventually result in the recognition of specific
389
additional exceptions to the hearsay rule.
Therefore, a critical component in the evolution of rules into standards and standards into rules is judicial experience. Both exceptions to
rules and specific applications of standards are developed by case law and,
as a body of case law accumulates, the courts reason from these cases with
arguments by analogy. Nonetheless, the analogies that the courts employ
in the evolution of rules are different from the analogies drawn in the
evolution of standards. The order of the progression of the stages of legal
reasoning is reversed in the two situations. The evolution of rules is the
mirror image of the evolution of standards.
As rules evolve into standards-as the law moves from formalism to
realism-a key step in the process occurs when the courts, through the use
of realist analogies, identify the underlying values thatjustify exceptions to
the rule. In contrast, as standards evolve into rules-as the law moves
grated across the legal form spectrum and become a standard. For example, if courts will enforce a rule that mothers are entitled to custody only
after reviewing all the unique circumstances of a divorce and determining

that the rule should not be abrogated for some reason, it is more appropriate to classify the law as a standard.
Id.
387. See Beaver, supra note 361, at 789-90 (warning that because courts have
improperly invoked residual hearsay exceptions in cases that were not "exceptional," "[t]he residual hearsay exceptions threaten to swallow the hearsay rule").
388. See Colliton, supra note 377, at 266 (describing how resulting rule is frequently erected statutorily). "As controversies develop, the I.R.S. and the courts
interpret the statutory standard in ways that cause Congress to amend the statute
by providing more detailed rules." Id.; see also Kaplow, supra note 366, at 621 (observing that standard may be "transformed into a rule by precedent"); Sullivan,
supra note 354, at 62 (stating that "[a] rule is a standard that has reached epistemological maturity.").
389. See, e.g.,
Lizbeth A. Turner, Admission of Grand Jury Testimony Under the
Residual Hearsay Exception, 59 TUL. L. REv. 1033, 1064-70 (1985) (proposing threestep approach to develop uniform guidelines for admission of grand jury
testimony).
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from realism to formalism-the key step in the process occurs when the
courts use formalist analogies to identify the factual similarities in the cases
that apply the standard. As rules age, the courts increasingly question
their validity as they are applied to unforeseen facts, and as standards age,
the courts incrementally determine their meaning.3 90 As noted in the

previous portion of this Article, reasoning by analogy is the bridge between formalism and realism.
Just as law is an amalgam of logic and morals, legal reasoning comprises both formalism and realism. Rules evolve towards standards to serve
justice, while standards evolve towards rules to enhance consistency and
predictability. Both justice and consistency are fundamental to a rational
system of justice. Each is a necessary counterweight to the other. The
evolution from rules to standards, and from standards to rules, represents
the complex interplay of these fundamental values of the legal system, as
legal reasoners engage in an unending cycle of assimilation and
accommodation.
V.

CONCLUSION

Legal reasoning embodies both logic and moral reasoning. As such,
legal reasoning exhibits the same stage structure that has been observed
by psychologists in the development of cognitive and moral reasoning.
This structure becomes evident when changes in society, including
changes that result from scientific progress, give rise to novel legal
problems. When faced with new fact situations, the reasoning of the
courts frequently follows a typical sequence. First, courts attempt to formalistically apply existing rules of law according to their terms to new
facts. If the courts are unable to define the terms of existing rules so that
they apply to the new case, then the courts draw analogies between the
new situations and familiar ones, applying the existing rules by analogy. If
these analogies break down, courts fashion new rules by means of a realistic balancing of policies and interests. The progression from formalism to
realism reflects the process of assimilation and accommodation described
by James Mark Baldwin, the cognitive change from concrete operations to
formal operations described by Jean Piaget and the change from conventional to postconventional moral thought described by Laurence
Kohlberg.
390. See Grodin, supra note 366, at 572 (describing swing of pendulum between rules and standards). He states that:
[A] tension typically develops between the rules and perceived principles
of justice, and courts begin to allow for exceptions. Some bright law student writes a law review note observing that the exceptions are so numerous and so vaguely defined as to "swallow the rule," and the courts
proceed to adopt the multi-factored standards that the bright student has
proposed. And so it goes, until someone suggests that the standards provide insufficient predictability, and that a "clear bright line" is needed.
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Reasoning by analogy may be either formalist or realist. Courts may
draw analogies by noting the factual similarities between previous cases
and new cases and, if these formalist analogies are deemed sufficient, then
the rule of the previous case will be applied to the case at hand. If the
formalist analogy is deemed insufficient, the courts may proceed to identify the values that are served and the interests that are protected by existing rules of law in considering whether those interests and values will be
similarly promoted by applying the existing rule to the case at bar. If the
realist analogy is also insufficient to persuasively justify a result, the courts
may then proceed to the third stage of legal reasoning, and may develop
new rules of law by directly balancing the underlying values and interests
that were identified through the use of realist analogies. In this way, reasoning by analogy serves as a bridge between formalism and realism.
Furthermore, as rules evolve into standards, and as standards evolve
into rules, a critical stage in the process is judicial experience in applying
the law. For standards to become rules, the courts must draw formalist
analogies between cases interpreting the standards, and for rules to become standards, the courts must draw realist analogies among the cases
interpreting the rules. This pattern in the evolution of rules and standards supports the concept that formalism, analogy and realism are the
stages of legal reasoning, and that analogy serves as the bridge between
formalism and realism.
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